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PRE-EMPLOYMENT SCREENING AND
INVESTIGATION: NAVIGATING BETWEEN A
ROCK AND A HARD PLACE
Stephen F.Befort*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Employers complain that they are caught between a rock and a
hard place when it comes to the issue of pre-employment screening.' They also contend that the gap is getting narrower all the
time.2 On the one hand, employers face mounting pressure to
screen and investigate their workforce applicants. 3 On the other
hand, employers are encountering increased pitfalls if they do.4
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. The author thanks Nancy
Brasel for research assistance and Anne Johnson for editorial assistance in preparing this
article.
1. See eg., David L. Gregory, Reducing the Risk of Negligence in Hiring, 14 EMrPL
REL_ L.J. 31, 31 (1988).
2. See generally id. at 31-32.
3. See a
4. Seei.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

1

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 1
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 14:365

Recent legal developments have played a significant role in creating this dilemma. Traditionally, the hiring process was one of the
least regulated aspects of the employment relationship.5 This has
changed dramatically in recent years, with a complicated web of
legal forces operating in a countervailing manner. As an example,
employers who fail to screen out potentially dangerous applicants
in the hiring process may be liable for substantial damages by virtue
of the emerging tort of negligent hiring.6 This significant incentive
for pre-employment screening is countered, however, by a growing
number of legal limitations such as those posed by the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 7 and the expanding potential for
defamation liability.8 Thus, employers who undertake screening
and investigation efforts to avoid liability may stumble unwittingly
into liability from other sources because of those very efforts.
Many scholars have written about the negligent hiring tort or
about specific pre-employment screening techniques such as reference checks and drug testing.9 This article attempts a different
approach by examining the pre-employment screening topic on a
"macro" level. This approach has several advantages. First, a broadbased overview produces a helpful road map that depicts the legal
landscape of pre-employment screening. Second, a "macro" analysis enables the development of an interest-based methodology for
establishing a pre-employment screening strategy that will avoid
both the rocks and the hard places of this landscape. Finally, the
"macro" view suggests several prospects for legal reform that would
appropriately balance the competing policy interests of employers
and job applicants and bring more coherence to the pre-employment screening process.
Part I of this article addresses the increasing pressure on
employers to engage in pre-employment screening efforts. In Part
III, the article examines the various screening and investigative
techniques available to employers and the legal limitations on their
use. In Parts IV and V, respectively, the article suggests a method5. See MARK COOK, PERSONNEL SELECTION & PRODUCTIvrrY 224 (2d ed. 1993).
6. See generally Gregory, supra note 1, at 31; Robert L. Levin, Workplace Violence:
Navigating Through the Minefield of Legal Liability, 11 LAB. LAW. 171 (1995); Ann Marie
Ryan & Marja Lasek, Negligent Hiring and Defamation: Areas of Liability Related to PreEmployment Inquiries, 44 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL 293 (1991).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (1994).
8. See Ryan.& Lasek, supra note 6, at 307.
9. See generally sources cited supra note 6.
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ology for addressing pre-employment inquiries and a number of
legal reforms that would enhance the treatment of the pre-employment screening topic.
I.

A.

REASONS TO SCREEN AND INVESTIGATE

The Rationalefor Pre-employment Screening

Employers screen and investigate job applicants for many reasons. In human resource terms, employee selection involves the
process of evaluating applicants for purposes of determining the
likely fit between the person and the job. 1 The selection process is
premised upon predicting future success on the job by identifying
those skills and characteristics critical for the position in question."This process of predictive assessment typically involves either
"screening in" applicants who possess desirable characteristics or
"screening out" applicants who possess undesirable
characteristics.' 2
The "screening-in" function attempts to identify attributes that
correlate with good job performance. Some of these attributes, such
as aptitude and good health, may be of a general nature. Other
attributes, however, are specific to the job. While a college degree,
good eyesight and in-flight experience may be desirable traits for an
airline pilot's position, they may be wholly irrelevant for a position
as an airline mechanic.
An employer's ultimate objective in screening for positive characteristics is to enhance work productivity.' 3 Research indicates
that good employees are more than twice as productive as mediocre
employees in many positions.' 4 Research further shows that many
10. See HERBERT G. HIENEMAN III & ROBERT L. HREMAN, STAFFING ORGANIZATIONS

336 (1994).
11. See id. at 336, 389.
12. See Ann Marie Ryan & Maria Lasek, Negligent Hiring and Defamation; Areas of
Liability Related to Pre-Employment Inquiries, 44 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL_ 293, 304 (1991)

(explaining that pre-employment "selection procedures can have [either] a 'screen-in' or a
'screen-out' focus").
13. See generally MARK COOK, PERSONNEL SELECr[ON AND PRODUCrIVIrY (2d ed.
1993); JOSEPH ZEMNER & CECIL D. JOHNSON, THE ECONOMIC BENEFrrs OF PREDICTING
JOB PERFORMANCE, VOL. I: SELECTION UTIMy (1991).

14. See CooK, supra note 13, at 1-10.
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pre-employment screening techniques have a positive correlation
with future on-the-job productivity. 15
Employers also are motivated to "screen out" applicants with
negative traits. 16 Employees who use illegal drugs or who have a
propensity for violence, for example, are not only likely to be less
productive, they also are more likely to subject employers to monetary liability. 7 In the screening-out function, employers attempt to
identify applicants who have engaged in past undesirable conduct.18
The rationale for this inquiry is that past behavior is thought by
many human resource specialists to be "the best predictor of future
behavior."' 19
Employers typically use more than one screening device in gathering information about applicants. 0 The desired mix of screening
techniques generally reflects the nature of the position in question.
For example, an employer may prefer to use "screen-in" techniques, such as an ability test, in hiring for a highly skilled job.2 ' On
the other hand, "screen-out" techniques, such as a criminal records
check, may be more appropriate in hiring someone for a safetysensitive position.' Ingeneral, the predictive value of pre-employment screening depends upon linking the selection plan with an
accurate assessment of the qualifications relevant to successful job
performance. 23

15. See CooK, supra note 13, at 254-55 tbl. 13.1 (listing validity coefficients for various
screening devices); ZmINER & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 143 (stating that pre-employment
"[t]esting can save [employers'] money because employees selected by valid tests are more
productive than those selected by other methods").
16. See Ryan & Lasek, supra note 12, at 304.
17. For a discussion of employer liability for employee misconduct see infra notes 62-105
and accompanying text.
18. See Ryan & Lasek, supra note 12, at 304.
19. Ryan & Lasek, supra note 12, at 293.
20. See CYNTmA D. FisHER ET A.., HumA RESOURCE MANAGEmENT 308 (3d ed.
1996) (stating that often, various selection "devices are used sequentially, in a multiplehurdle decision-making scheme").
21. See Ryan & Lasek, supra note 12, at 304 (stating that the use of a "screen-in"
approach might look for such characteristics as typing ability or a college degree).
22. See id. (citing the use of such "screening out" techniques as drug testing and
integrity testing).
23. See HEaimN & H
,supra note 10, at 389.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol14/iss2/1

4

19971

Befort: Pre-Employment Screening and Investigation: Navigating Between a
Pre-employment Screening & Investigation

B. Increasing Incentives for Pre-employment Screening
Pre-employment screening is on the rise.24 Over the past few
years, a growing number of employers have begun using a growing
number of screening techniques.' While many factors may be contributing to this phenomenon, three deserve special mention.26
1. Technological Advances
Pre-employment screening traditionally consisted of an interview, sometimes augmented by a reference check or an ability
test.27 Employers today, however, can choose from among an
increasing array of screening devices.2 8 In the realm of medical
screening, for example, employers can readily ascertain an applicant's use of drugs or exposure to HIV.2 9 Similarly, computer technology now enables employers to access substantial amounts of
background information concerning applicants, such as their criminal records and credit histories. 30
Two examples-genetic screening and computer-based testingillustrate that these technological advances are likely to continue in
24. See e.g., AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, 1996 AMA SURVEY ON
WORm'LACE DRUG TESTING AND DRUG ABUSE Poulcs 1 (showing a 277% increase in
workplace drug testing over the past decade); JOHN BOURDEAu, EMPLOYMENT TESTING
MANUAL: 1996 CUMULATrVE SUPPLEmENT 1.04(4)(a) (1996) (showing an increased use of

both skills tests and screening tests); MARK A. ROTHSTmIN, MEDICAL SCREENING AND THE
EMPLOYEE HEALTH COST CRISIS 1-6 (1989) (depicting an increase in various types of
medical screening).
25. See generally sources cited supra note 24.
26. These factors include technological advances, the "skills gap" and a fear of monetary
liability. See, e.g., HUDSON INsTrruTE, WORKFORcE 2000: WORK AND WORKERS FOR THE
TWNTY-FIRs' CENTURY (1987) (discussing generally the skills gap); ROTHSTEIN, supra note

24, at (citing the use of medical screening as one of these technological advances); David L.
Gregory, Reducingthe Risk of Negligent Hiring,14 EM PLRL. LJ. 31 (1988) (discussing the
possibility of substantial damages awarded due to inadequate screening of applicants).
27. See generally MARK COOK, PERSONNEL SELECTION & PRODUClIVrrY 15-18 (2d ed.

1993).
28. See generally DIANE ARTHUR, RECRUmiNG, INTERVIEWING, SELECIING &
ORnIM G NEw EMPLOYEES 201-29 (2d ed. 1991).
West's Legal News reports that Multi-Health Systems of Toronto, Canada released news of

its plan to begin marketing its "Emotional Quotient Inventory" ("EQ-i"), which it contends
will better measure job applicants' potential for success by measuring emotional traits. See

Employers May Soon be Able to Test One's Emotional Intelligence,West's Legal News, Jan. 7,
1997.
29. See RoTrmsEn, supra note 24, at 2. HIV testing and drug testing are discussed
respectively infra at notes 183-98, 212-83 and accompanying text.
30. Criminal records checks and credit history checks are discussed, respectively, infra at

notes 330-44 and accompanying text.
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the future. Genetic screening is a process for examining the genetic
makeup of individuals for certain inherited characteristics. 31 The
development of DNA technology in the 1980's significantly
enhanced techniques for locating and analyzing genes.32 This has
fueled the worldwide Human Genome Project, which aims to identify and map the approximately 50,000 human genes over the next
ten to fifteen years.33 This project (and related research) is expected
to "increase dramatically" the number of tests available for predicting an individual's susceptibility to genetic disorders. 34 In the workplace, such tests conceivably could be used to identify an applicant's
biological predisposition to an occupationally-related disease or to
identify genetic disorders that have the potential to drive up the
costs associated with employment.35
Computer technology provides a second example in terms of the
development of sophisticated ability and work sample tests. These
tests simulate the work environment and require applicants to
respond interactively to tasks and problems associated with the
job.36 Some of these tests already exist. Some employers in the
petroleum industry, for example, require applicants for truck driving positions to take a computer-based test that simulates the steps
taken in loading and unloading fuel.37 In the future, computer
experts will create "virtual reality" testing systems in which applicants interact in an artificial environment that depicts real world
behavior.38
Technological advances increasingly make it possible for employers to access more information concerning job applicants.39 Some of
these screening techniques, of course, raise legal and ethical concems, which are discussed below. The mere fact that such access is
31. See U.S. CONG., OFF. OF TEcH. ASSESSMENT, GENETc Mo~rrouNGr
SCREENNG rN Ta WoRKIcAcE 31-32 (U.S. Gov't Prtg. Off. ed. 1990).
32. See RomsmN, supra note 24, at 72-76.
33. See BouRDEAu, supranote 24, at 11.02(2)(b).
34. BOURDEAU, supra note 24, at 11.02(2)(b).

AND

35. See U.S. CONG., OFF. OF TEcH. AssEssmENT, supra note 31, at 31-36; RommSTn,

supra note 24, at 79-80.
36. See BoURDEAu, supra note 24, at 1.05(4).
37. See HERBERT G. HENEMAAN III & ROBERT L. HENEMAN, STAFFING ORGANiZATIONS

360 (1994).
38. See BOuRnEAu, supra note 24, at 1.05(4).
39. See generally RoTHTEIN, supra note 24.
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possible, however, provides employers with a powerful incentive to
avail themselves of the opportunity.4"
2. The Skills Gap
A second factor motivating employers toward more pre-employment screening is the growing skills gap in the American workplace. 4 1 This gap results from an economy that increasingly
demands more highly skilled workers and a labor supply that is failing to keep pace. 42
The increased demand for more highly skilled workers reflects
the ongoing transformation of the United States from a manufacturing-based economy to a service-based economy 4 3 This trend is
projected to continue into the near future as professional, technical
and service jobs replace those in the manufacturing sector." These
new jobs, in turn, require employees with more education and better skills.5.Even entry level jobs are demanding more complex
skills, as evidenced by the computer-based abilities now required
for many clerical positions. 46
The United States, however, has not developed the desired cadre
of skilled workers. 47 Part of the blame lies in low birth rates, which
are causing "the labor force [to grow] at a slower rate than at any
time since the 1930's. '4s This phenomenon also results in an aging
40. See, e.g., RoTsmN, supra note 24, at 79 ("With respect to genetic testing by
employers, if the cost is low, the accuracy is high, and the testing can be done quickly and
easily, it must be assumed that many employers would have an interest.").
41. See Mary F. Cook, Workplace 2000. Prospects and Challenges, Tim AMA
HANDBOOK FOR EMPLOYEE REcRurrMENT AND RETENTION 12 (Mary F. Cook ed., 1992).
42. See Lynn R. Offerman & Marilyn K. Gowing, PersonnelSelection in the Futura The
Impact of Changing Demographics and the Nature of Work, PERSONNEL SELECTION IN
ORGANIZATONS 387 (Neal Schmitt et al. eds., 1993). See generally HUDSON INSTrrUTE,
WOnUaFORcE 2000: WORK AND WORKERS FOR Tim Tw

rY-FiRsT CENuny (1987).

43. See HUDsoN INsrrruTE, supra note 42, at 20-29.
44. See id. at 96-101 (predicting, for example, a 44% increase in technicians' jobs and a
7% decrease in assembly jobs between 1984 and 2000).
45. See id. at 97-99 (predicting, for example, that 52% of the new jobs created between
1984 and 2000 will require some college education as opposed to only 42% of those jobs
existing in 1984).
46. See DIANE ARTHuR,REcRurING, INTERvIEwiNG, SELEcrING & OmNmiNro NEw

EMPLOYEES 2 (2d ed. 1991).

47. See, eg., Offerman & Gowing, supranote 42, at 386-89; ARTmu, supra note 46, at
1-7.
48. HUDsON INsTrurTE, supra note 42, at 76-79 (illustrating that the labor force during
the 1990's is growing at less than one-half of the 1970's growth rate); see also ARTHuR, supra
note 46, at 2.
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workforce that is less recently trained and less receptive to either
retraining or relocation.49 Moreover, a large number of those who
now are entering the workforce lack even rudimentary job skills,
much less the more advanced skills necessary for the new technological workplace.5
The skills gap means that employers are faced with a growing
need for a scarce resource. Not surprisingly, employers are turning
increasingly to pre-employment screening techniques to identify
workers who either possess the necessary skills for the job or are
capable of attaining those skills through on-the-job training
programs.51
3. Fear of Monetary Liability
Perhaps the most significant factor leading to an increase in preemployment screening activities is the fear of monetary liability for
workplace-related injuries. 2 Employers, of course, traditionally
have been liable for injuries caused by their employees when acting
within the scope of employment. 3 The potential for monetary liability is greater today, however, because of two recent developments: an increase in the incidence of workplace violence 54 and the
emergence of the negligent hiring tort.55 Both developments provide a powerful incentive for employers to minimize potential liability by screening out applicants with a propensity for violent or
otherwise injurious behavior.
49. See HtUDSON I~snTrUm, supra note 42, at 79-85 (projecting that the median age of
workers will grow from 35 years old in 1984 to approximately 39 years old in 2000 and will
result in a less adaptable workforce); ArnHU, supra note 46, at 1-2 (finding that the aging
workforce possesses fewer skills and has low retraining potential).
50. See JOHN BouRDEAu, EMPLOYmENT

TEsrING MANUAL:

1996 CUMULATIVE

StuPPmirr
1.05[1] (1996) (discussing the 1994 American Management Association survey
finding that 35.5% of job applicants were deficient in basic math and/or literacy skills);
HUDSON INsTrruTE, supra note 42, at 102-03 (discussing U.S. Department of Education data
showing that many new workers lack the basic skills essential for employment).
51. See ARTHUR, supra note 46, at 3-4; BouRDEAu, supra note 50, at 1.05[2].
52. See generally Robert L. Levin, Workplace Violence: Navigating Through the
Minefield of Legal Liability, 11 LAB. LAw. 171 (1995).
53. See discussion infra notes 64-73 for a discussion of respondeat superior liability for
injuries caused during the scope of an employee's employment.
54. See generally Levin, supra note 52.
55. See generally David L. Gregory, Reducing the Risk of Negligent Hiring, 14 EMPL.
REL L.J. 31 (1988).
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a. Workplace Violence
Violent behavior is an all too frequent occurrence in the contemporary workplace. A recent study estimates that more than two mil56
lion Americans are physically assaulted at work each year.
Workplace homicides now exceed more than 1,000 per year and are
second only to vehicular accidents as a cause of workplace fatalities.5 7 Taken together, one in four workers is harassed, threatened
or assaulted on the job during the course of a typical year.58
Regardless of who actually inflicts these injuries, employers face
a very real possibility of bearing ultimate legal responsibility.
Employers, for example, may be financially liable under anti-discrimination statutes for the harassing conduct of supervisors and
other employees.5 9 Employers also are responsible for workers'
compensation benefits payable to employees injured on the job
without regard to fault.60 Most significantly, however, employers
may be liable for substantial compensatory and punitive damages in
tort because of injuries caused by their employees, whether acting
61
within or without the scope of employment.
b. Tort Liability Theories
In general, employers may be held liable to third parties for injuries caused by their employees under two broad theories. First,
employers may be liable vicariously for acts committed by their
employees within the scope of their employment duties. 62 Alterna56. See NORTHwESTERN NAT'L LIFE INS. Co., FEAR AND VxoILENCE IN THE
WoRKPLAcE 4-5 (1993) (estimating that 2.2 million people had been physically attacked at
work between July 1992 and July 1993); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, VIOLENCE AND TIFr IN Tmn WoRPLACE 1 (1994) ("Each year nearly one
million individuals become victims of violent crime while working ....
).
57. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL CENSUS OF
FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES, 1995 1, 5 (1995).

58. See NORTHwEsTERN NAT'L L E INS. Co., supra note 56, at 4.
59. See eg., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (establishing standards for
sexual harassment claims under Title VII).

60. Under most state workers' compensation statutes, employers may be responsible for
benefits either directly as self-insurers or indirectly by purchasing insurance with premium
levels established through experience ratings. See Arthur Larson, Workers' Compensation
Law § 92.10 (1993).
61. See generally Levin, supra note 52, at 171.
62. See RMSTATEMENT (SECoiM) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958).
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tively, employers may be liable directly for their own negligence in
failing to ascertain an employee's propensity for inflicting injury.6 3
i. Vicarious Liability-Respondeat Superior
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be
liable for acts or omissions by an employee that cause injury to
another's property or person.' a Respondeat superior, however, only
imposes liability on employers for acts committed by an employee
within the scope of employment.65 The Restatement (Second) of
Agency section 228 states a general test for determining whether an
act is within the scope of employment, emphasizing that conduct is
not within the scope of employment "if it is different in kind from
that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or
too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master. '66
Though it may seem less likely that the motivation for an intentional tort will be to "serve the master," courts find intentional 67 as
well as negligent68 acts to come within the scope of employment.
Often, the determinative aspect of the scope of employment test is
the employee's purpose in committing the act. For example, in
63. See infra notes 74-105 for a discussion of employer liability for failure to ascertain an
employee's dangerous propensities.
64. The Restatement states: "A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants
committed while acting in the scope of their employment." REsTATEMIENT, supra note 62, at
§ 219(1).
65. See id. § 219(2).
66. Id.
at § 228(2). The Restatement goes on further to state:
Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the
kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized
time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the
master, and (d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use
of force is not unexpectable by the master.
Ld. at § 228(1).
67. Se4 e.g., Rivas v. Nationwide Personal Sec. Corp., 559 So. 2d 668, 670 (Fla. Ct. App.
1990) (upholding a jury verdict finding an assault to be within the scope of employment
because it arose out of a job dispute); Wilson v. R.F.K. Corp., 563 A.2d 738, 741 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1989) (finding the employer of a bartender who struck a patron liable for the patron's
resulting injuries); see also, e.g., Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah
1989) ("For purposes of liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior, it is not generally
relevant whether the sexual misconduct is categorized as an intentional or negligent tort.").
68. See, eg., Edgewater Motels, Inc. v. Gatzke, 277 N.W.2d 11 (1979) (holding an
employer liable for fire damage caused by an employee's negligent cigarette smoking while
performing work activities in a motel room and determining that "[t]o support a finding that
an employee's negligent act occurred within his scope of employment, it must be shown that
his conduct was, to some degree, in furtherance of the interests of the employer").
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Olson v. Connerly,69 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that "an
employee may be found to have acted within the scope of his or her
employment as long as the employee was at least partially actuated

by a purpose to serve the employer.

'70

In addition, the purpose of

the employee in serving the employer does not have to be the
71
employee's only or primary purpose.
Though the purpose inquiry usually applies to both negligent and

intentional torts, a few jurisdictions have drawn a distinction
between the standards for negligent acts and intentional acts, finding that for intentional acts, "[ilt is irrelevant whether the actual
assault involves a motivation to serve the master."'7 2 Most courts,

however, continue to place importance on employee intent when
determining whether an employee's intentional tort is within the

scope of employment. 73

69. 457 N.W.2d 479 (Wis. 1990).
70. Id. at 483. In Olson, a former patient sued a state university physician, the state, the
clinic and the university for emotional distress allegedly resulting from the physician's sexual
contact with the patient. See id. at 479. The Court noted that in order to determine whether
the sexual contact was in the scope of employment, it is proper to look at the employee's
intent-in other words, whether the employee was motivated "by an intent to serve his
employer or whether he had stepped aside from his employer's business to achieve an
independent purpose of his own." Id. at 484.
71. See id. at 483. The Seventh Circuit, applying Illinois law, has determined that an act
may fall within the scope of employment even if the predominant motive is to benefit the
employee, so long as one of the employee's purposes was to further the business. See
Roberson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 912 F.2d 184, 188 (7th Cir. 1990).
72. Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306,310
(Minn. 1982); see also Maryland Casualty Co. v. Huger, 728 S.W.2d 574, 579-80 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987). The court in Maryland Casualty focused on whether an employee's conduct in
inflicting intentional injury was "authorized, usual, customary, incidental, foreseeable, [or]
fairly and naturally incidental to his duties" rather than on the motive of the act or the time it
was committed. Id. at 580.
73. See, eg., Thatcher v. Brennan, 657 F. Supp. 6, 10 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (holding that a
salesman was not acting within the scope of employment when he became involved in an
altercation with the plaintiff because the purpose of the altercation was not to further the
employer's interest, but rather was intended to satisfy the salesman's purely personal
objectives), affd, 816 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1987); Los Ranchitos v. Tierra Grande, Inc., 861 P.2d
263, 268 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (determining that embezzlement was not within the scope of
employment by looking in part at whether the act was executed "with the view of furthering
the employer's interest and [thus] did not arise entirely from some external, independent and
personal motive on the part of the employee"); see also, eg., Liu v. Republic of China, 892
F.2d 1419, 1429 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying California law, the court stated that the employee's
intent should be a relevant factor in determining scope of employment, especially in cases of
intentional torts).
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ii. Direct Liability-Negligent Hiring
Direct employer negligence is an expanding area of employer liability and thus provides a substantial motivation for pre-employment screening.74 An employer may be liable for negligently hiring
employees when such negligence results in harm to third parties,
even when the harm inflicted by the employee occurs outside the
scope of employment and thus outside the scope of the respondeat
superior doctrine of liability.75
The tort of negligent hiring stems from an employer's duty "to
exercise reasonable care in view of all the circumstances in hiring
individuals who, because of the[ir] employment, may pose a threat
of injury to members of the public. ' 76 In order to prove negligent
hiring, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the employer owed the
third party a duty of reasonable care, 77 (2) the employer breached
the duty78 and (3) the breach proximately caused the third party's
harm.79
Under the first prong of this formula, an employer owes a duty of
care to those individuals "within the zone of foreseeable risks created by the employment [relationship]." 80 "[T]his is a direct duty
running from the employer to those members of the public whom
the employer might reasonably anticipate would be placed in a
position of risk of injury as the result of the hiring."'" The existence
of this duty, accordingly, turns on the type of position the employer
is seeking to fill and the foreseeability of harm to third parties.8 3
74. In addition to potential liability for negligent hiring, courts also have found
employers liable for direct negligence in retaining or supervising current employees. See
Robert L.Levin, Workplace Violence: Navigating Through the Minefield of Legal Liability, 11
LAB.LAW. 171, 175-76 (1995).
75. One court has noted that liability for negligent hiring arises from intentional
employee acts, which are "almost invariably outside the scope of employment, when the
employer knew or should have known that the employee was violent or aggressive and might
engage in injurious conduct." Yunker v. Honeywell, Inc., 496 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993).
76. Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1983).
77. See id.
78. See idat 912.
79. See id.
at 915.
80. Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So. 2d 435, 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
81. Ponticas,331 N.W.2d at 911 n.5.
82. In Williams v. Feather Sound, Inc., 386 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), the

court noted that "in analyzing the employer's responsibility to check out an applicant's
background, it is necessary to consider the type of work to be done by the prospective
employee." Id. at 1240.
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Thus, courts have found apartment building owners to owe a duty
of care to tenants in hiring an employee entrusted with a passkey s4
but not to a former employee who was killed by a custodian having
no special access to the victim.15
A breach of this duty occurs if an employer either "knew or
should have known" of an applicant's unfitness for the job but hired
the applicant anyway. 6
In order to allege facts sufficient to show breach of a duty [in a
negligent hiring action, the plaintiff must demonstrate] that: (1)
the employer was required to make an appropriate investigation
of the employee and failed to do so; (2) an appropriate investigation would have revealed the unsuitability of the employee for
the particular duty to be performed or for employment in general; and (3) it was unreasonable for the employer to hire the
employee in light of the information he knew or should have
known 8 7
Just as the existence of a duty often turns on the "type of work to
be done,"' ' 8 whether the court finds a breach of that duty will also
be determined with reference to the nature of the job,8 9 as well as
the reasonableness of the investigation undertaken. 90 As explained
by one court:
Although only slight care might suffice in the hiring of a yardman, a worker on a production line, or other types of employ83. The New Jersey Supreme Court described this duty as arising where the employer
"knew or had reason to know of the particular unfitness, incompetence or dangerous
attributes of the employee and could reasonably have foreseen [the risk of harm to others]."
Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 516 (N.J. 1982).
84. See Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc., 236 F.2d 673, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Ponticas,
331 N.W.2d at 911.
85. In Yunker, a custodial employee, who had been rehired after serving a jail sentence
for murdering a co-worker, again murdered a former co-worker. See Yunker, 496 N.W.2d at
421. The Minnesota Court of Appeals determined that Honeywell was not liable for
negligent hiring because it did not owe a duty to the deceased co-worker at the time of the
custodian's hire. See id. at 423. The court focused on foreseeability of harm, concluding that
the co-worker was not a foreseeable victim at the time of the hiring. See id. Significantly, the
court noted that a finding of liability for negligent hiring would have the effect of labeling exfelons as "inherently dangerous," thus deterring the hiring of individuals with criminal
records. Id.
86. Williams, 386 So. 2d at 1240.
87. Garcia,492 So. 2d at 440.
88. Williams, 386 So. 2d at 1240.
89. See id.
90. See id.
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ment where the employee would not constitute a high risk of
injury to third persons, "a very different series of steps are justified if an employee is to be sent.., to work for protracted periods in [a sensitive position posing foreseeable risks of harm]," 91
Accordingly, in many hirings, such as where employment duties will
bring the employee into contact with others only incidentally, an
employer need not make an independent inquiry into an applicant's
past.92 When an employee is hired for a sensitive position carrying
foreseeable risks, however, the obligation of reasonable care may
compel an employer to go beyond inquiries directed at applicants to
include investigative inquiries directed at third parties, such as reference checks and criminal record checks. 93
The last element a plaintiff must prove in a negligent hiring
action is proximate cause. 94 The required showing is that "through
the negligence of the employer in hiring the employee, the latter's
incompetence, unfitness or dangerous characteristics proximately
caused the injury."' This element is satisfied, for example, where
an employee inflicts harm on a foreseeable victim because of an
employer's failure to undertake a reasonable investigation that
would have disclosed a pattern of similar criminal behavior. 96
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Ponticas v. K.M.S.
Investments9 7 illustrates a typical fact pattern in which each of the
above elements were found to be present.98 In that case, the
employer of an apartment manager was found liable for negligent
hiring when the manager assaulted a female tenant of the complex,
even though the manager's intentional wrongful acts were outside
the scope of his employment. 99 The court found that the employer
91. Ponticas,331 N.W.2d at 913 (quoting, in part, Kendall v. Gore Properties,Inc., 236
F.2d 673, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1956)).
92. See Garcia,492 So. 2d at 441 (holding that "where the intended duties will require
only incidental contact with others, the requisite level of inquiry is correspondingly reduced
so that obtaining past employment information and personal data during the initial interview
may be sufficient").
93. See Welsh Mfg., Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 474 A.2d 436, 441 (R.I.
1984); Ponticas,331 N.W.2d at 913-15.
94. See Di Cosala,450 A.2d at 516.
95. Id.
96. See e.g., Ponticas, 331 N.W.2d at 914-15.
97. 331 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1983).
98. See id.
at 912-15.
99. See id.at 915-16 (holding that the rape could not be considered a "superseding
intervening cause," because a negligent hiring claim includes no such element).
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owed a duty to tenants because the employer benefited from the
employment relationship with the manager and entrusted the manager with a passkey to the apartment complex. 100 Since the manager
had been convicted of violent crimes prior to his employment and
the employer's cursory investigation failed to uncover this information, the court found a breach of duty, noting that the employer's
failure to discover information about a criminal record of violent
crimes was unreasonable in light of the severity of the risk posed by
furnishing the manager with a passkey to the apartments. 10 1 Finally,
"negligence in hiring ... was clearly the proximate cause of the
injury" to the plaintiff, because that negligence was the only reason
the apartment manager was on the premises and had access to the
02
plaintiff.
The significance of cases such as Ponticas for employer hiring
practices is clear: An employer who hires an unfit employee runs
the risk of liability for substantial tort damages, even where the
resulting injury is inflicted outside of the scope of employment or in
direct violation of stated employer policies.10 3 Accordingly, the
increasing recognition and application of the negligent hiring tort
creates a significant incentive for employers to investigate job applicants for dangerous propensities.1° 4
III.

LIMITATIONS ON SPECIC PRE-EMPLOYMENT
SCREENING INQUIRIES

Given the incentives discussed above, it is not surprising that
employers use a variety of techniques to screen potential employees
during the hiring process.105 Some screening activities, however, go
100. See id. at 911. The manager gained access to the plaintiff as a direct result of his
employment and the employer "received a benefit from [the manager's] employment in
having a caretaker for upkeep of the property and to aid tenants with complaints of property
malfunction." Id.
101. See id. at 914-15.
102. Id. at 915.
103. See Malorney v. B & L Motor Freight, Inc., 496 N.E.2d 1086, 1087, 1089 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986) (denying an employer's motion for summary judgment, where the employer was
sued for negligently hiring an over-the-road truck driver who assaulted a hitchhiker, even
though the employer had instructed the driver not to pick up hitchhikers).
104. See generallyDavid L. Gregory, Reducing the Risk of Negligence in Hiring,14 EMPL
REL. LJ. 31, 32,39-40 (1988); Robert L. Levin, Workplace Violence: Navigating Through the
Minefield of Legal Liability, 11 LAB. LAW. 171, 182-84 (1995).
105. See Levin, supra note 104, at 182.
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too far and are unlawful. 10 6 Some attempts to ascertain information,
for example, may be overly intrusive or have a negative impact on
protected classes."0 7 This presents, then, the core dilemma of preemployment screening: An employer who screens applicants in an
attempt to limit potential liability may incur liability because of the
manner or means of conducting that same pre-hire investigation.' 0 8
The following sections will examine the legal issues implicated by
some of the most commonly used pre-employment screening
devices. More specifically, these sections will attempt to delineate
the legal boundaries of pre-employment screening and investigation
techniques.
A. A Word About Recruiting
Federal anti-discrimination laws prohibit employers from using
advertisements that discriminate on the basis of protected-class status. 109 Thus, "help wanted" advertisements that state a preference
for applicants based on gender," 0 age"' or other protected-class
status" 2 are unlawful unless that characteristic is a "bona fide occu1 13
pational qualification" ("BFOQ") for the particular job involved.
In addition, certain advertising methods, such as reliance on wordof-mouth recruitment," 4 may have an unlawful discriminatory
106. See Gregory, supra note 104, at 32.
107. See generally id. (noting potential conflicts with privacy rights and employment
discrimination laws).
108. See id.
109. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (1994) (making unlawful advertisements which
"indicat[e] any preference, limitation, specification, or discirmination, based on... sex ......
except when these bases are "a bona fide occupational qualification for employment"); 29
C.F.R. § 1604.5 (1996) (stating that an advertisement may not disclose a "preference,
limitation, specification, or discrimination based on sex unless sex is a bona fide occupational
qualification for the particular job involved").
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.5.
111. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(e) (1994); see also 29
C.F.R. § 1625.4 (1996).
112. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (extending the ban on discriminatory advertising to
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin [except where such bases are] a bona fide
occuaptional qualification for employment").
113. Se4 e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.5.
114. See, e.g., Thomas v. Washington County Sch. Bd., 915 F.2d 922, 925 (4th Cir. 1990)
(holding that a word-of-mouth hiring practice may be unlawful where it disproportionately
excludes the hiring of minority employees); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543,549 (4th
Cir. 1975) (holding that the recruitment of truck drivers by word-of-mouth solicitation was
found discriminatory because it "perpetuate[d] the all-white composition of [the] work
force"). But see EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 305 (7th Cir. 1991)
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impact. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") suggests that advertisements should limit job opportunities only on the basis of necessary position-related skills and
qualifications. 115
B. Applications and Interviews
Written job applications and face-to-face interviews are two common methods by which employers gather information directly from
job applicants. 1 6 While these initial screening devices provide a
valuable means of assessing job qualifications, 1 7 an employer's
request for certain types of information may run afoul of anti-discrimination statutes, particularly Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("Title VII") and the Americans with Disabilities Act.118
Title VII,119 the principal federal anti-discrimination law, does
not expressly prohibit questions that elicit information concerning
protected class status.'20 Most courts have held that such questions
are not unlawful absent proof that the responsive information actually was used in the decision-making process.' 2 ' Nonetheless, the
use of such questions may give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.'x
(holding that an employer's "passive reliance on . . . word-of-mouth recruiting" by its
employees was not unlawful where the employer did not affirmatively instigate such a
practice).
115. See EEOC, TECmHNCAL AssisrANmc MANUAL FOR Hm ADA § 52 (1992). The
Technical Assistance Manual, implementing the Americans with Disabilities Act,
recommends that advertisements describe the essential functions of the job so as to attract
applicants, including those with disabilities, who possess the appropriate qualifications. See
id.
116. See CNrmA D. FisimR T AL., HUMAN RE-souc MANAGEMENT 308-09, 326 (3d
ed. 1996).
117. See id.
118. See infra notes 119-69 and accompanying text.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) (prohibiting discrimination in employment based upon
color, race, region, national origin and gender).
120. See generally EEOC Guide to Pre-EmploymentInquiries,8A Fair EmpL Prac. Man.
(BNA) 443:65 (1992).
121. Se4 e.g., Bruno v. City of Crown Point, 950 F.2d 355,363-65 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding
that child care questions asked of a female applicant during an interview were not unlawful
where the employer's decision not to hire was based on separate, nondiscriminatory reasons,
not on the applicant's response to such questions).
122. Se4 e-g., Barbano v. Madison County, 922 F.2d 139, 142-43 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding
that interview questions concerning gender and childrearing plans tainted the hiring process
and constituted evidence of discrimination).
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The EEOC has issued guidelines that interpret the impact of
Title VII on application and interview questions. 123 The EEOC
Guide to Pre-Employment Inquiries ("EEOC Guide") states that
questions that either directly or indirectly require the disclosure of
information concerning protected class status may constitute evidence of discrimination prohibited by Title VII.'2 Accordingly, the
EEOC Guide cautions against the use of questions that directly
inquire about protected class status such date of birth, religion and
national origin."
The EEOC Guide also counsels against the use of questions
which, while neutral on their face, may have a disparate impact in
screening out members of a protected class.' 26 For example, questions concerning an employer's height and weight requirements
may lead to the disqualification of a disproportionate number of
women or Asian-Americans. 27 he EEOC Guide states that the
use of such information in making hiring decisions is illegal unless
the information is needed to judge an applicant's competence or
qualification for the job in question."a
The EEOC Guide is helpful in terms of providing examples of
inquiries that may constitute evidence of "disparate impact" discrimination. Among those inquiries that the EEOC suggests
employers avoid, unless necessary for successful job performance,
are those that ask for the following types of information:
-marital status, number of dependents, and pregnancy;
-plans for more children and child care arrangements;
-English language skills;
-height and weight;
-education;
-friends and relatives working for the same employer;
-arrest and conviction records;
123. EEOC Guide to Pre-EmploymentInquiries,supra note 120, at 443:65. While EEOC
interpretative guidelines do not have the force and effect of law, courts generally accord them
considerable deference. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1977).
124. See EEOC Guide to Pre-EmploymentInquiries, supra note 120, at 443:65-66.
125. See id.
126. See generally id. at 443:65; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424 (holding that an employer's
education and testing requirements were unlawful because they disproportionately
disqualified minority applicants and were not shown to be necessary for job performance).
127. See EEOC Guide to Pre-EmploymentInquiries, supra note 120, at 443:66.
128. See id. at 443:65.
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-discharge status from military service;
-citizenship;
-credit history; and
-availability for work on weekends and holidays.

9

The Americans with Disabilities Act 130 goes further than Title

VII: It actually prohibits employers from asking about the existence, nature or severity of a disabling condition prior to the making
of a conditional job offer. 131 Thus, an employer may violate the
ADA by asking certain questions even if the responses are not used
in making an employment decision. 132 According to the EEOC,
which is charged with enforcing the ADA, this ban "helps ensure
that an applicant's possible hidden disability (including a prior history of a disability) is not considered before the employer evaluates
an applicant's non-medical qualifications.' 33
The EEOC also has issued the Enforcement Guidance on PreEmployment Inquiries Under the Amercians with Disabilities Act
("Guidance"), which interprets the ADA's regulation of preemployment inquiries. 34 The Guidance states that an employer at
the pre-offer stage may not ask "disability-related" questions, which
are defined as inquiries likely to elicit information about a disability.' 35 This ban clearly prohibits direct inquiries, such as a checklist

on an application form or an interview question that asks about the
existence of a current or past disability.136 The EEOC contends that
prohibited disability-related questions also include indirect inquiries that are "closely related" to disability status. 37
The "closely related" line of demarcation is not always easy to
discern. The touchstone adopted by the Guidance is to permit questions directed at abilities but not those primarily seeking informa129. See id. at 443:66-69.
130. The ADA prohibits discrimination in employment with respect to an individual with
a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the job. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). An individual has a qualifying disability
if he or she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity,
has a record of such an impairment or is regarded as having such an impairment. See id.
131. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(d)(2)(A), 12112(d)(3)(A) (1994).
132. See EEOC: Enforcement Guidance on Pre-Employment Inquiries Under the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:7191 (1995).
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. See id, at 405:7192.
136. See id.
137. See id.
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tion concerning impairment status.138 The Guidance goes on to
provide examples of permissible and impermissible inquiries,
including the following:
Ability to Perform/Impairments
Impermissible:
139
(1) Asking about the existence of impairments;
1 40
(2) Asking about limitations on major life activities;
(3) Asking one applicant to demonstrate ability to perform the
job but not other applicants (unless the former applicant has
a known or voluntarily disclosed disability);141 and
(4) Asking about workers' compensation history. 142
Permissible:
(1) Asking whether an applicant can perform the job;143
(2) Asking all applicants or those with a known disability to
demonstrate ability to perform; 144 and
(3) Asking about required certifications and licenses. 45
Attendance
Impermissible:
146
(1) Asking about frequency of illness.
Permissible:
(1) Asking about past attendance record; 47 and
(2) Asking about ability to meet employer's attendance
requirements.148
Reasonable Accommodation
Impermissible:
(1) Asking if an applicant needs a reasonable accommodation to
perform the job or a particular task. 49
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 405:7191-92.
id. at 405:7191.
id. at 405:7195.
id. at 405:7192.
id. at 405:7195.
id. at 405:7191.
id. at 405:7192.
id. at 405:7191-92.

146. See id. at 405:7194.
147. See id.

148. See id.
149. See id at 405:7193.
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Permissible:
(1) Asking if an applicant needs a reasonable accommodation
because of an obvious or voluntarily disclosed disability;150
and
(2) Asking if an applicant can perform
the job with or without a
5
reasonable accommodation.' '
Drug and Alcohol Use
Impermissible:
(1) Asking about use of lawful drugs; 152
(2) Asking about past addiction to alcohol or illegal drugs;' 53
(3) Asking about an applicant's past frequency of using illegal
drugs;' 54 and
(4) Asking about an applicant's frequency of using alcohol. 55
Permissible:
156
(1) Asking about current use of illegal drugs;
(2) Asking whether an applicant ever used illegal drugs in the
57
past;1
(3) Asking when an applicant last used illegal drugs; 58
(4) Asking whether an applicant uses alcohol;'5 9 and
(5) Asking whether an applicant has been arrested for driving
under the influence of alcohol. 60
The ADA severely limits disability-related questions, but only
61
prior to the extension of a conditional job offer to an applicant.'
Once a real job offer' 62 has been made, an employer may inquire
150. See id. at 405:7193-94.
151. See id.at 405:7192.
152. See id.at 405:7195-96.
153. See id. at 405:7196.
154. See id.
155. See it
156. See id. at 405:7195.
157. See id. at 4057196.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 405:7195-96.
161. See 42 U.S.C. §12112(d) (1994); see also EEOC: Enforcement Guidance on PreEmployment Inquiries Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man.
(BNA) 405:7191, 7199 (1995) [hereinafter EEOC: Enforcement Guidance].
162. The ADA Division of the Office of Legal Counsel has determined that a job offer is
"real" when "the employer has evaluated all relevant non-medical information which it

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

21

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 1
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 14:365

about disability status even if not related to the job. 63 An
employer, however, may not rescind an offer on the basis of disability-related responses unless the disqualifying criterion is "jobrelated and consistent with business necessity."1 64
The statutes of many states also limit pre-employment inquiries
relating to protected class status 65 and some do so in a manner
more restrictive than federal law. 166 In West Virginia, for example,
state law prohibits pre-employment inquiries concerning race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex or age. 167 A Minnesota
statute extends this list to cover creed, marital status, disability, status with regard to public assistance and sexual orientation. 168 To the
extent that these state laws provide the same or greater protection
1 69
against discrimination, they are not preempted by federal law.
C. Medical Examinations
1. Medical Examinations and the ADA
Employers frequently use medical examinations to determine if
prospective employees can perform certain jobs effectively and
71
safely.170 The ADA, however, bans pre-offer examinations'
because of a concern that the exams may be used to exclude applicants with disabilities from jobs they are able to perform. 7 '
An employer may require a medical examination after making an
offer of employment that is conditional upon the satisfactory outcome of the examination, if it is required of all new hires within the
same job category. 73 The ADA does not limit the scope of such an
reasonably could have obtained and analyzed prior to giving the offer." EEOC Enforcement
Guidance, supra note 161, at 405:7200.
163. See id. at 405:7192.
164. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3) (1996).
165. See ag., CAL Gov'T CODE § 12940 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West
1991); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:54 (West 1993); N.Y. ExEC LAw § 296(1)(d) (McKinney 1993).
166. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(4)(a); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4; N.Y. EXEc.
LAw § 296(1)(d).
167. See W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(a)(2) (1994).
168. See MN. STAT. §363.03, subd. 1(4)(a).
169. See 29 U.S.C. § 633 (1994) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-7 (1994) (Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (1994) (ADA).
170. See DIANE ARTmUR, REcRuTIo, ImERvmwiNa, SELECTING & OitmiNo NEw

EMPLOYEES 219 (2d ed. 1991).
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (1994); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.13(a), 1630.14(b) (1996).
172. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (discussing the findings and purpose of the ADA).
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b).
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examination, but provides that any disability-related criteria used to
screen out a prospective employee must be "job-related and consistent with business necessity." 174
At least one state statute is even more restrictive. 175 The Minnesota Human Rights Act mirrors the ADA in prohibiting medical
examinations unless required of all applicants receiving a conditional offer for that position. 176 The Minnesota statute goes further,
however, and provides that a post-offer
examination may test only
1 77
for essential job-related capabilities.
Given these statutory restrictions, it is important to determine
what constitutes a "medical examination." The Guidance defines a
"medical examination" as a "procedure or test that seeks information about an individual's physical or mental impairments or
health. ' 178 The Guidance lists a number of factors relevant in determining whether a procedure or test is a medical examination1 79 and
then illustrates the application of these factors with reference to a
number of specific practices, such as the following:
Physical fitness tests: A test of an applicant's performance of
physical tasks, such as running or lifting, is not a medical examination unless the employer also measures the applicant's
physio80
logical or biological responses to performance.'
174. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(d)(4), 12112(d)(2)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3).
175. See MmNN. STAT. ANN. § 363.02, subd. 1(9)(i).

176. See id. § 363.02, subd. 1(9)(i)(a),(c).
177. See id. at subd. 1(9)(i)(b). The ADA does not preempt state laws "that provide[]
greater or equal protection for individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b).
178. EEOC: Enforcement Guidance, supra note 161, at 405:7197.
179. The Guidance lists the following factors as helpful in determining whether a
procedure or test is medical:
Is it administered by a health care professional or someone trained by a health
care professional?
Are the results interpreted by a health care professional or someone trained by a
health care professional?
Is it designed to reveal an impairment or physical or mental health?
Is the employer trying to determine the applicant's physical or mental health or
impairments?
Is it invasive (for example, does it require the drawing of blood, urine or breath)?
Does it measure an applicant's performance of a task, or does it measure the
applicant's physiological responses to performing the task?
Is it normally given in a medical setting (for example, a health care professional's
office)?
Is medical equipment used?
Id.
180. Id. at 405:7198.
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Psychologicalexaminations:"Psychological tests are medical if

they provide evidence that would lead to identifying a mental disorder or impairment.... [But a psychological test is not a medical examination if] designed and used to measure only things
such as honesty, tastes, and habits ...."'8
Vision tests: An evaluation of an applicant's ability to read
labels or distinguish objects as part of a demonstration of the
applicant's ability to do the job is not a medical examination. An
ophthalmologist's or optometrist's analysis of an applicant's
vision or requiring an applicant to read an eye chart would be a
medical examination." 8

2. Some Specific Types of Medical Examinations
a.

Testing for HIV

The AIDS epidemic claims approximately 50,000 American lives
each year."8 3 Tests of blood samples"' can detect the presence of
antibodies to HIV even in individuals who have not yet progressed
to the stage of full-blown AIDS. 185 This testing process clearly falls
within the ADA's definition of a "medical examination" and is sub6

8
ject to the restrictions noted above.'

While the ADA does not preclude post-offer testing for HIV, 8 7
employers will act unlawfully in most circumstances if they reject an
offeree based upon a positive test result.'88 Both case law' 8 9 and
181. Id.at 405:7198-99.
182. Id.at 405:7199.
183. See Joii

BouRDEAu, EMhPLoYMENT TESriG MANUAL:

1996 CuMuLATwVE

SUPPLENTrr § 15.01 (1996). It is estimated that more than one million individuals in the
United States are infected with HIV. See Robert B. Fitzpatrick & E. Anne Benaroya,
Americans With DisabilitiesAct and AIDS, 8 LAB. LAw. 249 (1992).
184. Serologic testing procedures for HIV infection are described in Recommendations
for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-CareSettings, 36 MORBIDrY & MORTALITY
WuLY. REP. No. 2S (1987).

185. See Fitzpatrick & Benaroya, supra note 183, at 249.
186. See id.
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (1994).
188. See EEOC: Enforcement Guidance on Pre-Employment Inquiries Under the
Americans With DisabilitiesAct, 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:7191, 7199-202 (1995).
189. See, eg., Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 95 F.3d 1285, 1290 (4th Cir.
1996); Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763,777 nn.36-37 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
Cases decided under the older Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797(b)
(1994), which uses a similar definition of disability, have reached the same result. See, e.g.,
Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 679-80 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Local 1812, AFGE v. U.S. Dep't of
State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D.D.C. 1987); 'Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F.
Supp. 376, 379-82 (C.D. Ca. 1986).
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ADA interpretive guidance1 90 recognize that a person with a positive test result for HIV is a protected individual with a disability
even at an asymptomatic stage. 191 Accordingly, the ADA permits
an employer to rescind an offer based upon a positive test result
only if the applicant is unable to perform the job' 92 or if the presence of the virus poses a direct threat to the health or safety of
others. 193 Since HIV is spread only through the exchange of bodily
fluids, 94 a direct threat arguably exists only with respect to those
few occupations with a significant likelihood of bodily fluid
exchange, such as medical personnel performing invasive procedures. 195 Even here, however, the Centers for Disease Control
("CDC") does not recommend a program of mandatory testing. 96
A minority of states have enacted statutes that specifically
restrict the use of HIV testing. 97 One source has summarized these
statutes as falling into the following categories:
[S]ome states prohibit employers from performing HIV tests or
requiring the disclosure of the results of an HIV test. Other states
ban HIV testing of employees but not applicants, ban only the
HIV testing of current health care employees, or ban only the
HIV testing of state applicants and employees. Another group of
states permits HIV testing only if being HIV negative is a bona
190. See generally 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1996).
191. An individual with HIV is "asymptomatic" (1) if AIDS antibodies are present in the
body, without more or (2) if the virus is present but latent. See Fitzpatrick & Benaroya, supra
note 183, at 250.
192. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12113; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3).
193. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). The ADA regulations define a direct threat as involving "a
significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that
cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
194. See REPORT OF Tm PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON Tim HUMAN
IMMUNODFICIENCY VIUs EPIDEmic 113, 119 (1988) (reporting that HIV is not spread
through casual contact in the workplace and there is no justification of fear of transmission in
the vast majority of workplace settings).
195. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick & Benaroya, supra note 183, at 264-65; see also, e.g.,
Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings, 36
MoRBmrry & MORTALITY VKLY. REP.3S-9S, 15S (1987).
196. See Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings,
36 MORamrry & MORTALIT WVKLY. REP., at 15S-17S. The CDC recommends, instead, that
health care workers who perform exposure prone procedures voluntarily monitor their own
HIV status and refrain from performing those procedures if they become HIV infected. See
id.
197. See, e.g., CAT. HEAL.r & SAF=rY CODE § 120980(F) (West 1997); Ky.REv. STAT.
ANN. § 207.150(1) (Banks-Baldwin 1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19203-C (West
1996); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3701-243 (Banks-Baldwin 1996); VT. STAT. ANN.tit. 21,
§ 495 (1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.15 (West 1996).
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fide occupational qualification, which is certified
by the state epi98
demiologist or proven by the employer'
b. Genetic Screening
Genetic screening involves the detection of heritable traits, such
as a predisposition to certain diseases and disorders. 199 At the present, very few employers engage in any type of genetic testing. 200 As
noted above, however, technical
advances may make such tests
201
more viable in the near future.
As with testing for H[V, an employer's use of genetic screening
to disqualify an otherwise qualified applicant likely will violate the
ADA under most circumstances. 2°2 For example, an applicant who
is screened out on the basis of a genetic test indicating a heightened
risk for developing a particular disease most likely is protected
under the ADA as an individual with a perceived disability.203 At
the same time, the unmanifested disease does not constitute a legiti-

mate justification for the employer's action since it does not impair
the applicant's current ability to perform the essential functions of

the job.2°

An employer may make out a more defensible case for genetic
screening if the screening is limited to tests that seek to identify
198. MARK A. ROTHSTIN ET Ai., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.23 (1994).
199. U.S. CONG., OFF. OF TEcm AsassMmrr, GENErc MoirrORNo
AND ScRmEEzro n
THm WoRPLAcE 31-32 (1990).

200. See id. at 184. At present, genetic screening tests are possible for only a fraction of
the 3,000 known heritable diseases and many of these are not practical for widespread use.
See JoHN BounnFAu, EMLoYmENT TE TiNG MANUAL

1996 CuMuLATrvE SUPPLEmENT

§ 11.02[2][b] (1996).
201. See discussion supra notes 27-40 and accompanying text.

202. See 136 CONG. REC. H4623 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (statement of Sen. Owens).
203. Individuals protected under the ADA include those who are "regarded" as having a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. See
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (1996). The EEOC has issued an
interpretation to the effect that an individual discriminated against because of an increased
risk of a genetic disorder is regarded as having a disability and, therefore, protected by the
ADA. See 2 EEOC CompL Man. at 902.8(a) (1995).
204. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(m).
The determination of whether an individual with a disability is qualified is to be
made at the time of the employment decision. This determination should be based
on the capabilities of the individual with a disability at the time of the employment
decision, and should not be based on speculation that the employee may become
unable in the future or may cause increased health insurance premiums or
workers['] compensation costs.
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genetic susceptibility to a disease because of occupational exposure.205 In this situation, the employer is not simply avoiding higher
health care and absenteeism costs, but also the increased likelihood
that individual harm will occur. 206 EEOC regulations suggest that
an employer may refuse to hire an individual who would pose a
direct threat to the health or safety either of that individual or of
others.207 This "self-directed threat of harm" defense, even if a permissible gloss on the somewhat different language of the ADA,2 °8
likely would apply only in a very narrow set of circumstances.20 9
Beyond the ADA, four states have enacted statutes specifically
prohibiting pre-employment genetic screening.21 0 Two of these statutes permit an employee to consent to a genetic test for the purpose
of determining the employee's susceptibility to disease because of
occupational exposure to potentially toxic substances, so long as no
adverse action is taken against the employee as a result of the
test.21 '
D.

Testing for Drug and Alcohol Use

The most heavily regulated area of medical screening is arguably
for drug and alcohol use. 21'2 Potential limitations on the ability of
employers to perform drug and alcohol testing in the hiring process
come from five sources: the ADA, 13 the Fourth Amendment to the
205. See BouRDnEu, supra note 200, at § 11.06[5A][a].
206. See U.S. CONG., OFF. OF TECH. AssassMErr, Genetic Monitoringand Screening in

the Workplace 5 (U.S. Gov't Prtg. Off. Ed. 1990).
207. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
208. The "direct threat" defense as articulated in the ADA mentions only "the health or
safety of other individuals in the workplace." 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (emphasis added).
209. The American Medical Association's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
recommends that genetic testing be used to screen out workers who have a genetic
susceptibility to occupational illness only where the following conditions exist: (1) The
disease in question is so serious and "develops so rapidly" that employment monitoring is not
feasible; (2) the genetic test in question "is highly accurate"; (3) "[e]mpirical data
demonstrate" the link between the genetic trait and the occupational illness; (4) "[i]t would
require undue cost" to lower the level of the toxic substance and (5) testing occurs only with
the "informed consent of the employee or applicant." Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
American Medical Ass'n, Use of Genetic Testing by Employers, 266 JAMA 1827,1830 (1991).
210. See IOwA CODE § 729.6(2) (1995); O. Rnv. STAT. § 659.227 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 28-6.7-1 (1956); Wis. STAT. § 111.372 (1995).
211. See IOwA CODE § 729.6(7)(b); Wis. STAT. § 111.372(4)(b).
212. See generally MATrBEW W. Fmnur, NPrvAcy IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 19-52 (1995).

213. 42 U.S.C. §12114 (1994).
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United States Constitution,2 14 state constitutions,215 state statutes
regulating drug and alcohol testinge2 1 6 and state common law causes
of action in tort.217
1. The ADA and Drug Testing
The ADA distinguishes between drug testing and alcohol testing.218 The ADA expressly provides that testing for drug use is not
a "medical examination" and is not restricted by the ADA even at
the pre-offer stage. 19 In effect, the ADA presumes that being drugfree is inherently job-related and consistent with business necessity.2 20 This presumption is consistent with the ADA's exclusion of
current illegal drug use from the definition of a protected "qualified
221
individual with a disability.
In contrast, the ADA treats alcohol testing the same as any other
medical examination.m An employer, accordingly, may test for
alcohol use only after making a conditional offer of employment
and may withdraw the offer based on the test result only if failing
the test establishes that the applicant is unable to perform the
job.2'
2. Public Sector Testing
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures conducted or mandated
by the government. 224 Thus, the Fourth Amendment is implicated
214. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
215. See, eg., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARmZ. CONsT. art. II, § 8; CAi. CONST. art. I,
§ 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; LA. CONST. art. I,
§ 5; MONT.CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. See
generally Stephen M. Fogel et al., Survey of the Law on Employee Drug Testing, 42 U. MINhI
L. l~v. 553, 650-53 (surveying state constitutions and their guarantees of privacy as applied
to employee drug testing).
216. See infra notes 251-71 and accompanying text.
217. See infra notes 272-82 and accompanying text.
218. See, eg., EEOC Technical Assistance Manual for the ADA § 8.9 (1992); EEOC
Enforcement Guidance on Pre-Employment Inquiries Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:7191, 7199 (1995).
219. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(d)(1).
220. See eg., Thomas v. Mississippi State Dep't of Health, 934 F. Supp. 768, 774 (S.D.
Miss. 1996).
221. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a).
222. See EEOC Technical Assistance Manualfor the ADA § 8.9 (1992).
223. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3).
224. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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when the government intrudes upon expected areas of privacy by
compelling the production of bodily fluids.' - More specifically, the
Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment applies to the
government, acting as an employer, for requiring employees to produce urine samples for drug testing purposes.226 Such "searches"
are not per se illegal, but must be analyzed for reasonableness.2 7
Accordingly, the constitutional legality of public sector drug and
alcohol testing programs depend upon the specific circumstances of
each program.228
TWo Supreme Court decisions provide some guidance concerning
the validity of governmental drug testing programs. 229 In National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,'23 0 the Court, in a five to
four decision, upheld a drug testing policy adopted by the United
States Customs Service which required testing as a condition for
placement in positions involving the interdiction of illegal drugs or
requiring the carrying of firearms. 31 The Court explained that
where a Fourth Amendment intrusion such as this does not relate
to criminal law enforcement but serves special governmental needs,
neither a search warrant nor individualized suspicion is necessary to
justify the search 32 Instead, the Court adopted a test of reasonableness, in which the government's need to conduct the search is
balanced against the individual's expectations of privacy.233 The
Court found that the government had demonstrated compelling
interests in deterring drug use among those responsible for safeguarding international borders either through drug interdiction or
the use of firearms.3 4 These interests, the Court concluded, outweighed the privacy expectations of prospective employees, which
225. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966).
226. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-18 (1989).
227. See iL at 619.
228. See generally Fogel et al., supra note 215, at 567-83 (noting that some courts have
held that an employee must have a reasonable suspicion that an employee is under the
influence of drugs before it can require that employee to undergo drug testing).
229. See Nat'l Treasury Empl. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1988); Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
230. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
231. See id. at 677.
232. See iL at 665-66.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 668.
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were diminished by virtue of advance notice of the testing requirement and the sensitive nature of the job duties involved.235
The testing program at issue in Von Raab also applied to positions requiring the handling of classified material.236 The majority
opinion stated that testing would be appropriate for positions
exposed to truly sensitive information, but remanded the issue of
determining which positions fell within this category.3 7
The Supreme Court also sustained a governmental drug testing
policy in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n. s In that
case, the Court upheld the validity of federal regulations requiring
railroads to conduct post-accident drug tests of railroad crews.239
The Court found that the government's interest in the "safety-sensitive tasks" of covered railroad employees, coupled with the demonstrated connection between drug use and train accidents, justified
the privacy intrusion even in the absence of any individualized suspicion of actual drug use.240
Subsequent challenges to government-mandated drug testing
programs have focused on the government's need to test.241 This
determination, in turn, generally is based on a review of the responsibilities of the tested employees. 242 Courts are more inclined to
permit testing programs with respect to employees performing
safety-sensitive tasks.24 3
3. State Constitutions
Employees may look for protection from unreasonably intrusive
drug testing from their respective state constitutions.2 4 Although
ten state constitutions provide either an express or an implied right
235. See id. at 672.
236. See id. at 677-78.
237. See id.
238. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
239. See id. at 634.
240. See id. at 629-33.
241. See, e.g., Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 488-96 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding
the testing of Department of Justice employees with top security clearances, but not the
testing of all federal prosecutors and employees with access to grand jury proceedings);
AFGE v. Cavazos, 721 F. Supp. 1361, 1369-74 (D.D.C. 1989) (upholding the testing of
Department of Education motor vehicle operators, but not of data processing employees).
242. See generally Harmon, 878 F.2d at 484; Cavazos, 721 F. Supp. at 1361.
243. See id.
244. See, eg., ALAsKA CoNsr. art. I, § 22; Aum CONST. art. II, § 8; CA. CONST. art. I,
11; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; HAW. CONsr. art. I, § 6; It.. CONST. art. I, § 6; LA. CONST. art. I,
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of privacy,245 the California Court of Appeal was the sole court to
address the issue of applicant testing on that basis. 4 6 In Wilkinson

v. Times Mirror Corp.,247 job applicants brought a state constitutional challenge to a policy asking all job applicants to consent to a
drug test as a condition of an offer for employment. 48 The California Court of Appeal analyzed the policy under Von Raab and Skinner, ultimately determining that while not "all preemployment drug
and alcohol testing by private employers is constitutional," the policy at issue did not violate the applicants' constitutional guarantee
of privacy. 24 9 Accordingly, no state, as of yet, has recognized any
specific state constitutional limitation on the pre-employment drug
testing of applicants.250
4. State Statutes
In the absence of constitutional provisions protecting employees
in the private sector, state legislatures have stepped in "to fil the
'
void of protection,"2'
enacting statutes regulating drug testing of
applicants and employees?252 The pace of enactment of state drug
testing statutes has been fast with thirteen states currently having
statutes which regulate drug testing in the private sector. 3
§ 5; MONT.CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7; see also
supra note 216 and accompanying text.
245. See sources cited supra note 244.
246. See Jonathan V. Holtzman, Applicant Testing for Drug Use: A Policy and Legal
Inquiry, 33 Wm.& MARY L. Rv. 47, 76 (1991).
247. 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
248. See id at 196, 197.
249. Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr at 206. The Wilkinson court found that applicants have a
lesser privacy interest than do employees in terms of employer drug testing. See id. at 203.
See generally Patricia A. Hunter, Comment, Your Urine or Your Job: Is Private Employee
Drug Urinalysis Constitutionalin California?,19 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1451 (1986).
250. See Holtzman, supra note 246, at 74.
251. Stephen M. Fogel et al., Survey of the Law on Employee Drug Testing, 42 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 553, 653 (1988).
252. See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
253. The thirteen states are Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont. See CONN.GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 31.51t-31.51bb (Vest 1994); FLA. STAT. Am. § 440.102 (West 1996); IowA
CODE ANN. § 730.5 (West 1996); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § R.S.23:1601(10) (West 1997); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit26, §§ 681-690 (1996); MD. HEALTH GEN. CODE ANN. § HG17-214
(1996); MnN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.950-181.957 (West 1996); Mor. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304
(1995); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 48-1107.02(9)-(10) (1996); On. REV. STAT. §§ 659.225, 659.227
(1995) (applying to alcohol testing); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 28-6.5-1 to -2 (Michie 1995); UTAH
CODE ANN.§§ 34-38-1 to -15 (Michie 1989); VT. STAT. ANN.tit. 21, §§ 511-520 (Equity 1987);
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Although these statutes limit the rights of employers to test
employees and applicants for drug use, they vary widely in both
substantive and procedural regulation.254 Significantly, these statutes generally provide fewer restrictions on applicant testing than
they do for testing current employees.255
Some statutes, including Maine, Minnesota, Rhode Island and
Vermont, allow applicant testing only upon a conditional job
offer.2 5 6 Minnesota adds the substantive requirement that the same
test must be requested or required of all job applicants conditionally offered employment for the position sought. 7 Other statutes
provide additional protection for job applicants, prohibiting
employers from requiring job applicants to submit to drug testing as
a condition of employment except in specific situations, usually
involving specialized employment. 8 In Montana, for example, the
prohibition covers all applicants "except for employment in hazardous work environments, [or in] jobs the primary responsibility of
which is security, public safety, or fiduciary responsibility"259 or in
certain transportation-related positions.2 6 ° Iowa's statute restricts
the employer's power to include drug testing as part of a preemployment physical examination,2 61 but the restriction does not
apply to drug testing for positions as Iowa peace officers or correctional officers.262
see also Jeffrey J. Olsen, A Comprehensive Review of PrivateSector Drug Testing Law, 8
HosnRA LAB. LJ. 223, 232 (1991).
254. Indeed, the lack of uniformity in state drug testing laws has sparked suggestions of
federal reform. See Olsen, supra note 253, at 233-34; Ruth Silver Taube, Drug Testing: Is
Preemption the Answer?, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 657, 659 (1993).
255. See eg., MrN,. STAT. § 181.951 (authorizing testing for all applicants receiving a
conditional job offer without further restriction, but authorizing testing for current
employees only in certain specified circumstances); Jonathan V. Holtzman, Applicant Testing
for Drug Use: A Policy and Legal Inquiry, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 47, 74 (1991) ("A few
jurisdictions, including the City and County of San Francisco, have strictly regulated
employee testing but imposed no restrictions whatever on applicant testing.").
256. See ME.REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 684(1); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.951(2); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 28-6.5-2; VT. STAT. ANN.tit. 21, § 512(b)(1).
257. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.951(2).
258. See eg., ME.REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 684(1); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.5-2; VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 512(b).
259. MoNT.CODE. ANN. § 39-2-304.
260. See ad
261. See IowA CODE ANN.§ 730.5(2).
262. See id,
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Connecticut gives employers more latitude, requiring only that
the employer inform applicants that drug testing is a condition of
employment.263 Still more latitude is afforded employers in Utah,
the first state to pass drug testing legislation. 264 The purpose of the
Utah statute is to facilitate, rather than to restrict, employer drug
testing 65 and it places only procedural requirements on employers
wishing to test job applicants. 56
All of the state statutes providing substantive protection to job
applicants provide some sort of procedural protection as well. For
example, most statutes provide for a confirmatory test upon a first
finding of a positive result2 67 and some give the employee the right
to request a confirmatory retest-essentially a third test.268 Other
safeguards usually found in drug testing statutes "include the use of
properly certified laboratories, ...chain of custody procedures,
...confidentiality [requirements], written notice to applicants and
employees, employee assistance programs, and procedures to
ensure privacy in the collection of samples. 269
In a somewhat different vein, seven states have enacted statutes
that limit an employer's discretion to make employment decisions
based upon the off-duty use of lawful consumable products such as
alcohol and tobacco.270 The North Carolina statute is typical in
making unlawful an employer's refusal to hire an applicant because
263. See CoN,. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31.51v.
264. See Taube, supra note 254, at 673.
265. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-1 ("[I]n balancing the interests of employers,
employees, and the welfare of the general public, the Legislature finds that fair and equitable
testing for drugs and alcohol in the workplace, in accordance with this chapter, is in the best
interest of all parties.").
266. See Ud §§ 34-38-1 to -15.
267. See, eg., M'N. STAT. ANN. § 181.953, subd. 10(a) ("An employer may not
discharge, discipline, discriminate against, or request or require rehabilitation of an employee
on the basis of a positive test result from an initial screening test that has not been verified by
a confirmatory test."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-6(5) ("Testing shall include verification or
confirmation of any positive test result ....
").
268. See e.g., MIN. STAT. ANN. § 181.953, subd. 9 ("An employee or job applicant may
request a confirmatory retest of the original sample at the employee's or job applicant's own
expense after notice of a positive test result on a confirmatory test.").
269. Olsen, supra note 253, at 233.
270. See Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 820, § 55/5-20 (West 1996); MINN. STAT. § 181.938 (1995); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 290.145 (West 1992); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-313 (1979); NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 613.333 (1996); N.C. GEM. STAT. § 95-28.2(b) (1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.321-.35
(1996). Approximately 16 other states have statutes that specifically ban employment
discrimination based upon the off-duty use of tobacco products. See MATrrmw W. FNMnN,
PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 52, 322-29 (1995).
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of the off-duty use of alcohol or tobacco unless the use of such
products adversely affects "the employee's job performance or the
person's ability to properly fulfill the responsibilities of the position
in question or the safety of other employees." 271
5. Common Law Torts
In the absence of a state statute regulating employee or applicant
testing, employees and job applicants may have causes of action
under state common law for highly intrusive or negligently administered testing.272 Many of the potential claims, however-most notably the public policy exception to employment at will-are
available only to employees and not to job applicants. 73
The torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy are the most likely claims available to
job applicants, although the former is more likely to succeed than
the latter.274 An employer potentially may be liable in the drug testing arena for invasion of privacy under a theory of intrusion upon
the plaintiff's private affairs 75 if he/she "intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or
his private affairs or concerns... [where] the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person."2 76 Courts usually consider
four factors significant to the success of such a claim: "(1) the
271. N.C. GN. STAT. § 95-28.2(b).
272. See Stephen M. Fogel et al., Survey of the Law on Employee Drug Testing, 42 U.
Mwmx L. REv. 553, 660-66 (1988).
273. The public policy exception to "employment at will" has been successfully invoked
to challenge the mandatory drug testing of current employees. See T1wigg v. Hercules Corp.,
406 S.E.2d 52,55 (W. Va. 1990). In Twigg, the West Virginia Supreme Court determined that

a cause of action for a discharge contravening "a substantial public policy" lies when "an
employer [requires] an employee to submit to drug testing, since such testing portends an
invasion of an individual's right to privacy." Id. The court, however, recognized exceptions to
its rule, stating:
Drug testing will not be found to be violative of public policy grounded in the
potential intrusion of a person's right to privacy where it is conducted by an
employer based upon reasonable good faith objective suspicion of an employee's
drug usage or where an employee's job responsibility involves public safety or the
safety of others.
Id.
274. See Fogel et al.,
supra note 272, at 658.
275. There are four causes of action recognized under the common law tort of privacy:
"[i]ntrusion upon the plaintiff's private affairs, public disclosure of private facts, publicity that
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye, and appropriation of the plaintiffs name
or likeness." Id.at 666.
276. REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652(B) (1977).
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employer's business needs which prompted the testing, (2) the
scope of the testing, (3) the manner of the testing, and (4) employee
notice of, or consent to, the testing."277 Although courts have recognized that drug testing programs may intrude upon an
employee's seclusion, 278 they likely will uphold such tests if reasonable in light of the above four factors. Because most employers provide advance notice to applicants required to submit to drug testing,
the "prior notice diminishes, and accordingly legitimizes, the
employer's testing program."2 79
A job applicant subjected to a drug test as a condition of employment is more likely to succeed under the theory of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
[In order to establish a claim] based on this theory, an employee
must prove: (1) that the employer acted in an extreme and outrageous manner; (2) that the employer intended to cause [severe
emotional distress], or acted in reckless disregard of the
probability that severe emotional distress would result from the
conduct; (3) that the employer's extreme and outrageous conduct
actually and proximately caused the emotional distress; and (4)
that the resulting emotional distress was severe. 0
In Kelley v. Schlumberger Technology Corp.,281 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals, applying Louisiana law, held that the district
court properly instructed the jury that "an employer.., has a duty
to use reasonable care in implementing and administering its drug
program so as not to cause serious emotional distress to its employees."' This tort thus focuses on the manner in which the drug test
is administered by the employer.
277. Frank J. Cavico, Invasion of Privacy in the Private Employment Sector: Tortious and

Ethical Aspects, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1263, 1312 (1993).
278. Se4 e.g., Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 621-22 (3d Cir. 1992)

(analyzing a public policy exception to "at will employment" claim in the light of whether the
discharge was related to "a substantial and highly offensive invasion of the employee's
privacy" and envisioning "at least two ways in which an employer's urinalysis program might
intrude upon an employee's seclusion").
279. Cavico, supra note 277, at 1314; see also Baggs v. Eagle Picher Indus., 750 F. Supp.
264, 272 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (recognizing that requiring urine samples is an intrusion, but that
the "plaintiffs had no expectation of privacy with regard to drug testing since they had been
on notice" that drug testing was a condition of employment).
280. See Fogel et al., supra note 272, at 675.
281. 849 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1988).
282. Id. at 43.
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E. Non-medical Testing
1. Ability Tests
Ability tests are mechanisms designed to assess an individual's
capacity to perform certain desired tasks. 283 They encompass measurements for a broad range of capabilities, including those that are
cognitive, psychomotor, physical and/or sensory in nature. 2 For
the most part, these tests do not fall within the ADA's definition of
a "medical examination" and, therefore, can be used by employers
at any stage of the selection process.u 5
Anti-discrimination statutes pose the principal legal impediment
to the use of ability tests.u 6 Although these tests generally do not
discriminate overtly on the basis of protected class status, they may
be unlawful nonetheless if they disproportionately disqualify applicants of a particular class. 28
This "disparate impact" form of discrimination was first recognized in the landmark case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.- 8 In that
case, the employer required applicants for semi-skilled positions to
pass a general aptitude test measuring cognitive abilities in order to
become eligible for work at an "inside" job.2u 9 The test had the
effect of disqualifying a substantially greater proportion of black
applicants than white applicants.2 90 The Supreme Court ruled that a
test having such a disparate impact is unlawful unless the employer
can show that the test results are job-related and consistent with
business necessity. 291 Since some individuals hired prior to the test
requirement continued to perform adequately in these positions,
the Court held that the employer had failed to make the requisite
showing and that the test was invalid. 2- 2
283. See HERBERT G. HENEMAN & ROBERT L HENEMAN, STAFmIo ORGANIZATIONS
358 (1994).
284. See id. at 359.
285. See EEOC: Enforcement Guidance on Preemployment Inquiries Under the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:7191, 7197-99 (1995).
286. See generallyMARK COOK, PERSONNEL SELEcTioN & PRoDucrTrry 224-42 (2d ed.
1993) (citing Title VII and EEOC guidelines as primary obstacles to the use of many ability

tests).
287. See id.
288. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

289. See id, at 428.
290. See id.at 429.
291. See id. at 431.

292. See id. at 431-32.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol14/iss2/1

36

19971

Befort: Pre-Employment Screening and Investigation: Navigating Between a
Pre-employmentScreening & Investigation

The EEOC has adopted guidelines to assist employers in avoiding liability for disparate impact discrimination 293 The Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures ("Guidelines")2 94
states that employers should conduct validation studies for tests
that adversely impact protected groups.2 95 These studies, often performed by industrial psychologists, attempt to determine whether
scores on a particular test correlate with successful performance of
the job in question.2 96 If the job analysis and test study establishes
the validity of the test by one of the three methods recognized by
the Guidelines, 97 the test is considered appropriately job-related
for purposes of the Griggs standard.
Some testing devices pose more problems than do others. General aptitude tests of the type invalidated in Griggs, for example,
frequently result in disparate impact problems that necessitate
costly validation efforts.298 On the other hand, work sample tests
that replicate actual job tasks, such as a typing test, have a lesser
incidence of adverse impact and a higher predictive relationship
with on-the-job performance. 299
2. Polygraphs
Polygraphs, or "lie detectors" as they are often called, attempt to
determine an individual's truthfulness by measuring his or her physiological reaction to a set of questions. 0 0 The use of polygraphs in
293. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1996).
294. Id. § 1607.
295. See id. § 1607.3(A).
296. See generally Diane Arthur, Testing, in Tam AMA HANDBOOK FOR EMPLOYEE
RECRutrrMENT AND RETENmTON 88 (Mary F. Cook ed., 1992).

297. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5. The guidelines recognize three types of validation: (1)
criterion-related validation (a statistical demonstration between scores on a selection
procedure and the job performance of a sample of workers), (2) content validation (a
demonstration "that the content of [a] selection procedure is representative of important
aspects of [job] performance") and (3) construct validation (measurement of an underlying
human trait or characteristic that is important to job performance). Id. § 1607.5(B).
298. See generally EEOC Guide to Pre-EmploymentInquiries, 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man.
(BNA) 443:65 (1992).
299. See, eg., CYNTmA D. FISHER ET Ai, HuMAN RnsouRcE MANAGBEMENT 321 (3d ed.
1996).
300. See U.S. CoNG., OFF. OF TECH. AsSEssMENT, ScImNanac VALmrrY oF POLYGRAPH
TESTING 11 (1983).
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the employment setting is controversial for a number
of reasons,
30 1
including concerns about their scientific validity.
The federal Employee Polygraph Protection Act ("EPPA"), 3°
adopted in 1988, essentially bans polygraph testing as a prehire
screening device in the private sector. The EPPA makes it unlawful
for covered employers 30 3 either to ask any prospective employee to
take a polygraph test or to use the results of such a test in making
an employment decision. 3 4 The EPPA further bans polygraph testing for current employees except in connection with ongoing investigations, where an employer has reasonable suspicion of an
employee's involvement in a workplace incident that results in economic loss or injury.30 5
More than one-half of the states have also enacted statutes limit30 6 Some of
ing the use of polygraphs for employment purposes.
these statutes are even more restrictive than the EPPA. 0 7 Iowa's
law, for example, prohibits employers, including most public
employers, from asking an applicant
or employee to take a poly308
circumstances.
any
under
graph test
3. Integrity and Personality Tests
With polygraph testing essentially prohibited, employers increasingly are turning to pen-and-paper tests as alternative screening
tools. 309 While these tests come in many formats, two of the most
common are integrity tests and personality tests.310 Integrity tests
attempt to gauge an applicant's attitudes toward theft and dishon301. In 1983, the federal Office of Technology Assessment reviewed the scientific
literature concerning polygraph testing and concluded "that there is at present only limited
scientific evidence for establishing the validity of polygraph testing." Id. at 96.
302. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1994).
303. The EPPA applies to most employers other than public employers, national defense
and security employers or employers authorized to manufacture or distribute controlled
substances. See 29 U.S.C. § 2006.

304. See 29 U.S.C. § 2002.
305. See 29 U.S.C. § 2006(d).
306. See MATruEw W. Fau'ra, PRiVACY IN EMPLoYmNT LAw 59 (1995).
307. See 29 U.S.C. § 2009 (providing expressly that the EPPA does not preempt state
laws that are more restrictive).
308. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.4 (West 1988). Iowa's prohibition applies to state and
local governmental employers except when selecting candidates for positions as either police
or corrections officers. See id. § 730A(3).
309. See George Allan Hanson, To Catch a Thief. The Legal and Policy Implications of
Honesty Testing in the Workplace, 9 LAW & NEo. J. 497, 498-99 (1991).
310. See generally FmNKI, supra note 306, at 62-76.
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esty. 311

Personality tests are more complicated, in that they attempt
to assess an individual's psychological profile, including such traits
as violence, authority conflict and the degree to which an individual
is prone to addiction.312
In contrast to polygraphs, integrity and personality tests are
largely unregulated by statute.3 13 Only two state statutes currently
restrict the use of these testing devices. 314 Nonetheless, future challenges are likely, since these tests are often criticized because of
concerns related to privacy, reliability and potential discriminatory
impact. 315 A recent study of integrity tests by the Office of Technology Assessment, for example, concluded that "the existing research
is insufficient as a basis for supporting the assertion that these
tests
'316
can reliably predict dishonest behavior in the workplace.
A California decision, Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp.,317 illustrates some of the potential legal implications of integrity and personality testing. In Soroka, the California Court of Appeal granted
a preliminary injunction against a retail employer's use of a personality test in screening applicants for store security officer positions.31 8 This particular test, Psychscreen, included questions
pertaining to religious beliefs and sexual practices. 319 The court
enjoined the use of this test on both constitutional and statutory
grounds.320 The court first found that the test was likely to violate
California's constitutionally-protected right to privacy. 21 The court
held that the privacy invasion occasioned by the test may be justified only upon a showing that the invasion serves a compelling, jobrelated interest and found that the employer had failed to make
311. See Hanson, supra note 309, at 504.
312. See generally FNIU, supra note 306, at 62-66.
313. See e.g., Hanson, supra note 309, at 514-18.
314. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 19B (West 1959) (banning the use of integrity
tests for employment purposes); R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-6.1-1 (1995) (providing that an
integrity test cannot be used "to form the primary basis for an employment decision").
315. See e.g., Hanson, supra note 309; Donald HJ. Hermann III, Privacy, the Prospective
Employee and Employment Testing: The Need to Restrict Polygraph and Personality Testing,
47 WAs.H L. REv. 73 (1971).
316. U.S. CONG., OFF. OF TECH. AsEssmrr, Trm USE OF INTEGRrry TEsrs FOR PREEMLoYmENT Scnm,NwQ 10 (1990).
317. 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (1991).
318. See id. at 79.
319. See id. at 79-80.
320. See id. at 86-88.
321. See id. at 86.
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such a showing with respect to the questions about religion and
sex.322 The court also concluded that the test was likely to violate
anti-discrimination statutes by requiring applicants to divulge information concerning religious beliefs and sexual orientation. 323 While
this decision is based on California law and the specific attributes of
the Psychscreen test, the concerns noted in Soroka undoubtedly will
fuel a broader debate over the appropriateness of these screening
devices.
The ADA also has the potential to be a major deterrent to psychological testing. Guidelines issued by the EEOC suggest that
some psychological examinations may be construed as "medical
examinations" under the ADA, which may not be administered at
the pre-offer stage.3 2 4 The Guidance states that psychological examinations would be considered medical examinations to the extent
that they provide evidence concerning whether an applicant has a
recognized mental disorder or impairment. 32- On the other hand,
the EEOC guide goes on to state that a test designed and used to
measure only such factors as an applicant's honesty, tastes and habits normally would not be considered a medical examination.326
Even if the test is not itself a medical examination, the ADA prohibits the use of test questions at the pre-offer stage that inquire as
to the existence, nature or severity of a disability.32 7 Finally, and
most significantly, the ADA bans the use of information disclosing
the existence of a mental impairment in making an employment
decision unless necessary for successful job performance.328
F. Background Checks
1. Criminal Records
Employers check criminal records to ascertain whether an applicant has a past history of dishonest or violent behavior and to avoid
liability for negligent hiring. 329 An employer's reliance on such
322. See id.

323. See id. at 87-88.
324. See EEOC: Enforcement Guidance on Pre-Employment Inquiries Under the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:7191, 7197-98 (1995).
325. See iL at 405:7198.
326. See id. at 405:7199.
327. See id.
328. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3) (1996).
329. Employer liability for negligent hiring is discussed supra at notes 74-104 and
accompanying text.
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records to disqualify applicants, however, may give rise to liability
under anti-discrimination statutes if such a practice disproportionately excludes minority applicants.330
Courts generally are less tolerant of an employer's use of arrest
records, as opposed to conviction records. In addition to the disparate impact issue, arrest records also suffer from the fact that they
do not establish that the individual arrested actually committed the
charged crime.331 An EEOC policy statement suggests that a blanket exclusion of applicants on the basis of arrest records almost
invariably will be unlawful.332 The statement goes on to state that
an employer may use arrest records as evidence of disqualifying
conduct only where the arrest was relatively recent, the applicant
likely committed the conduct alleged in the arrest record and that
conduct is related to the job at issue.333
Conviction records are more reliable than arrest records because
the criminal justice system has established that misconduct actually
occurred. Even here, however, courts have struck down employers'
use of convictions as an absolute bar to employment.3 34 The EEOC
adopts the position that an employer should use conviction records
only when consistent with "business necessity. ' 335 That is, an
employer who rejects an applicant because of a prior conviction
must show that its decision was justified by a consideration of the
nature and gravity of the offense, the timeliness of the conviction
and the nature of the job in question. 36
330. See EEOC Policy Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest Records, N-915-061,
EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 7 2094, at 2099-23 (discussing statistics showing higher rates of
arrest for blacks and Hispanics); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971) (stating
that minorities in the United States have historically experienced arrest and conviction rates
substantially in excess of the nonminority population). The United States Supreme Court has
recognized that otherwise neutral selection devices that have a disparate impact on protected
classes may violate Title VII. See Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
331. See, eg., Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970),
modified on other grounds, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
332. See EEOC Policy Guidance on the Considerationof Arrest Records, supra note 330,
at 2094. See, e.g., Gregory, 316 F. Supp. at 401.
333. See EEOC Policy Guidance on the Considerationof Arrest Records, supra note 330,
at 2094.
334. See Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 549 F.2d 1158, 1159-60 (8th Cir. 1977); Carter
v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 326 (8th Cir. 1971).
335. See EEOC Policy Document on Conviction Records, EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH)
app. 604-A, 2088 (1993).
336. See iL
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2. Credit Records
An employer's investigation into an applicant's credit history also
raises disparate impact concerns. The EEOC Guide to Pre-Employment Inquiries states that the rejection of applicants based on credit
records has a disparate impact on minority groups, 337 since they
tend to be poorer and to have more credit difficulties than
whites. 338 Accordingly, the EEOC advises that an employer's reliance on credit records to exclude minority
applicants is unlawful
339
absent a showing of business necessity.
The federal Fair Credit Reporting Act 340 also regulates an
employer's use of credit reports. This statute requires that a prospective employer "clearly and accurately" notify applicants in writing if they will be the subject of a consumer credit report prepared
by a consumer reporting agency 41 An additional notification is
required if a credit report actually is used in making an adverse
decision, such as a refusal to hire an applicant.34 An individual who
is the subject of a credit report is entitled to obtain disclosure of
information on file with the consumer reporting agency, to request
deletion of erroneous material and to submit a statement that disputes items in the report.343
3. References
An employer may obtain significant information concerning an
applicant's work history by asking for and contacting references,
particularly when the references are past employers.a n Though reference checks are both a useful? 45 and common 46 tool in screening
337. See EEOC Guide to Pre-EmploymentInquiries,8A Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA)
443:65, 69 (1992).
338. See generally Minority Loans Grew in '95, HMDA, Reg. Compliance Watch, Aug. 5,
1996, at 1 (noting that overall denial disparity rates are twice as high for minorities as they
are for whites).
339. See EEOC Guide to Pre-Employment Inquiries,supra note 337, at 443:69; see also
EEOC Decision No. 72-0427 (1971) (holding that the failure to hire an applicant for a
computer operator's position because of a poor credit record was discriminatory on the basis
of race).
340. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1994).
341. Id. § 1681d.
342. See id. § 1681m.
343. See id. §§ 1681g, 1681i.
344. See Charles D. iefer, Note, Qualified Privilege to Defame Employees and Credit
Applicants, 12 HAuv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 143, 147-48 (1977).

345. Professors Ramona Paetzold and Steven Willborn note:
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job applicants, a former employer who provides reference information may run the risk of being sued for defamation 47 In the context of references, a past employer may be liable for defamation if
false information which damages a former employee's reputation is
published to a prospective employer.318
a.

Qualified Privilege

The most frequently litigated issue with respect to reference defamation claims concerns whether the former employer abused its
"qualified privilege" 3 9 in providing information to the prospective
employer. Generally, in order to serve the public interest by
encouraging "accurate assessment[s]" of an employee's qualifications, 350 employers have a qualified privilege to communicate
information about the employee to others.3 " The Indiana Court of
Appeals noted that the privilege exists because "[t]here is a selfevident social utility in free and open communications between former and prospective employers concerning an employee referAlthough many types of individuals can serve as reference providers, former
employers are generally viewed as capable of providing the most useful, beneficial
reference information.... To the extent that other selection measures are costly
and/or ineffective, and to the extent that termination of unproductive employees
and turnover of dissatisfied employees become more costly, the relative value of
reference information becomes even greater.
Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Wiliborn, Employer (Ir)Rationality and the Demise of
Employment References, 30 AM. Bus. LJ. 123, 125 (1992).
346. Paetzold and Willbom estimate that "between fifty and one hundred percent of all
employers check references to screen job applicants." Id. at 124-25.
347. See id. at 126-27.
348. See id. at 126-28; Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 259 (Minn.
1980) (holding a former employer liable for defamation because of false statements
communicated to a prospective employer that was damaging to the employee's reputation).
349. See Higgins v. Gordon Jewelry Corp., 433 N.W.2d 306, 308 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988)
(relying on the Iowa Supreme Court decision in Robinson v. Home Fire & MarineInsurance
Co., 49 NAV.2d 521 (Iowa 1951), which defined a qualified privileged communication as "one
made by a person who has an interest in the subject matter to one who also has an interest in
it or stands in such a relation that it is a reasonable duty or a proper one for the person to
make the statement").
350. Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 257.
351. See, eg., TIrner v. Halliburton Co., 722 P.2d 1106, 1114 (Kan. 1986) (applying a
qualified privilege to an employer who truthfully told a prospective employer that the
employee in question was terminated for "'stealing company property'"); Stuempges, 297
NAV.2d at 257 ("In the context of employment recommendations, the courts generally
recognize a qualified privilege between former and prospective employers as long as the
statements are made in good faith and for a legitimate purpose.").
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ence. '3 52 The privilege will be lost, however, if the information is
communicated with "malice," which is defined differently by differ353
ent Courts.
Some courts follow the standard of common law malice, which
requires a showing of "actual ill will, or intent to causelessly and
wantonly injure the plaintiff."' 354 Other courts, however, use the
"actual malice" standard in employer defamation actions, which
requires a plaintiff to prove that "the statement was made with
knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it was
true or false." 355 The principal distinction between these two standards, as noted by the Minnesota Supreme Court, is that while the
common law standard focuses on the employer's "attitude toward
the plaintiff," the actual malice standard focuses on the employer's
"attitude toward the truth." 356
b. Doctrine of Self-Publication
A fairly recent development in this area is employer liability for
self-compelled defamation.357 Even if the former employer does not
352. Chambers v. American Trans Air, Inc., 577 N.E.2d 612,615-16 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
353. See Deborah Daniloff, Note, Employer Defamation: Reasons and Remedies for
DecliningReferences and Chilled Communications in the Workplace, 40 HAsrmas L.J. 687,
710-11 n.134 (1988) (citing seven cases and quoting their different definitions of malice).
Daniloff lists the following.
Quinones v. United States, 492 F.2d 1269, 1275 (3d Cir. 1974) (wrongful act done
intentionally without just cause or excuse); Time, Inc. v. Ragano, 427 F.2d 219, 221
(5th Cir. 1970) (false disregard for the truth); Goforth v. Avemco Life Ins. Co., 368
F.2d 25, 31 (4th Cir. 1996) (bad faith); Hollander v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc.,
382 F. Supp. 96, 101-02 (D. Md. 1973) (use of unnecessarily abusive language, or
other circumstances that would support a conclusion that the defendant acted in an
ill-tempered manner or was motivated by ill will); Jiminez v, Maritime Overseas
Corp., 360 F. Supp. 142,146 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("gross disregard" for rights of injured
party); Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 188 F. Supp. 565, 569 (D. Mass.
1960) ("disinterested malevolence" or "senseless spite" and "desire to inflict
pain.., for the sake of making somebody else squirm"); Rollenhager v. City of
Orange, [citation omitted] 172 Cal. Rptr. 49, 53-54 (1981) (hatred or ill will toward
plaintiff).
Id.
354. Karnes v. Milo Beauty & Barber Supply Co., 441 N.W.2d 565,568 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989).
355. Krasinski v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 530 N.E.2d 468,471 (Ill. 1988); see also Evely
v. Carlon Co., 447 N.E.2d 1290, 1293 (Ohio 1983) (upholding a grant of summary judgment
for the employer where the employee could not demonstrate that the employer acted with
actual malice).
356. Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 258.
357. See Daniloff, supra note 353, at 688 & nA.
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communicate directly with the prospective employer, but instead
communicates the information only to the former employee, the
former employer may be liable for defamation under the doctrine
of self-publication. 5 8 Under this theory, a former employee can
recover from the employer if the employee was terminated, was
given a defamatory reason for the termination and was either likely
to or compelled to disclose the defamatory reason to a prospective
employer. 9 There are two different approaches to this theory:
Under one, the employer will be liable if he or she "knew or could
have foreseen the employee would be likely to repeat the defamatory statement" and under the second, somewhat more restricted
approach, the employer will be liable only if the employer "knew or
could have foreseen the 36
employee
would be compelled to repeat the
0
defamatory statement.
In First State Bank v. Ake, 361 a Texas court adopted the "likelihood standard" of self-publication defamation. 62 Ake, a bank president, brought an action against the bank and its chairman for
defamation when the bank filed a fidelity bond claim against
him.3 63 Since fidelity bond claims only cover losses through an
employee's dishonest or fraudulent acts, 364 the filing was considered defamatory. 65 When applying for jobs with prospective
employers, Ake told the employers that the bond claim had been
filed against him, because the claim "was surely to be brought out
during the application and interviewing process. '366 The court
stated:
One who communicates defamatory matter directly to the
defamed person, who himself communicates it to a third party,
has not published the matter to the third person if there are no
other circumstances. If the circumstances indicated that communication to a third party is likely, however, a publication may
358. See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 888 (Minn. 1986)
(holding that an employer will be liable if it was foreseeable that the plaintiff would have to
publish defamatory statement).
359. See Deanna J. Mouser, Self-Publication Defamation and the Employment
Relationship, 13 IND. RE. LJ. 241, 255 (1991).
360. Id.
361. 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
362. See id. at 701.
363. See id. at 698-99.
364. See id. at 700.
365. See id. at 702.
366. Id. at 702.
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properly held to have occurred. Likewise, if a reasonable person
would recognize that an act creates an unreasonable risk that the
defamatory matter will be communicated to a third party, the
conduct becomes a negligent communication, which amounts to367a
publication just as effectively as an intentional communication.
The second approach, and the one more often followed, is the
compulsion approach, under which an employer is liable only if it
either knew or should have known that the employee would be
compelled to repeat the defamatory statement. In Churchey v.
Adolph Coors Co.,368 for example, the plaintiff, fired for "dishonesty," asserted that publication had occurred because she "ha[d]
been forced to repeat the reason for her discharge to prospective
employers to her damage and detriment ...."369 The court adopted
the compulsion approach, stating that when "'the originator of the
defamatory statement has reason to believe that the person
defamed will be under a strong compulsion to disclose the contents
of the defamatory statement to a third person,' the originator is
responsible for that publication. '370 In adopting this stricter standard, the Court reasoned that "[i]f publication could be based on
the defamed person's freely-made decision to repeat a defamatory
remark.., the defendant would be held liable for damages which
'371
the plaintiff reasonably could have avoided.
Not all jurisdictions, however, recognize the self-publication doctrine. The Illinois Court of Appeals, in Layne v. Builders Plumbing
Supply Co.,372 explicitly rejected the doctrine of self-publication,
reasoning that the claim would be disadvantageous for the following reasons:
(1) recognizing the claim would discourage plaintiffs from mitigating damages because employees could increase damages by
repeating the statement when the repetition was not necessary or
when the employee could have tried to explain the true nature of
367. Id. at 701 (quoting RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF ToRars § 577, cmts. m, k (1977)).
The Texas Court of Appeals followed the Ake decision in Chasewood Construction Co. v.
Rico, 696 S.W2d 439 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). See generally Neighbors v. Kirksville College of
Osteopathic Med., 694 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (adopting the "likelihood" standard).
368. 759 P.2d 1336 (Colo. 1988).
369. Id. at 1343.
370. Id. at 1344 (quoting McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93-94
(1980)); see also Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 876 (adopting the "compulsion" approach).
371. Churchey, 759 P.2d at 1345 (Colo. 1988).
372. 569 N.E.2d 1104 (IIL. App. Ct. 1991).
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the defamatory situation to the prospective employer; (2) recognizing the claim would deter employers from communicating to
the employee the reason for the employee's termination; and (3)
recognizing the cause of action would thwart the public interest
in providing information regarding the73reason an employee was
discharged to prospective employers?
The potential for defamation lawsuits and liability in tort have
made former employers reluctant to give reference information to
prospective employers.3 74 As a result, most employers currently
either give no reference information or limit references to a simple
confirmation of prior employment.375
IV.

A

COST/BENEFiT THEORY OF PRE-EMPLOYMENT SCREENING

At first glance, employers appear to be caught between a rock
and a hard place in attempting to navigate the pre-employment
screening landscape. The complex legal framework in this area
makes employers sometimes liable if they investigate applicants and
sometimes liable if they do not.
A more comprehensive review, as attempted in this article, however, reveals less a trap and more a pathway of opportunity. As
with any path, its successful navigation depends upon knowing the
terrain and planning the journey. The prior two sections of this article provide a road map to the legal terrain of pre-employment
screening. This section suggests the outlines of a planning process
for employers seeking to navigate the pre-employment screening
pathway.
As the legal analysis set out in the first two sections of this article
indicates, pre-employment screening efforts are sometimes desirable and sometimes not. Employers most successfully can determine
whether screening efforts are desirable by using a cost/benefit analysis that focuses on the attributes of the position to be filled. Under
this approach, an employer should engage in applicant screening
only where the benefits of using a particular screening device to
373. Mouser, supranote 359, at 265 (citing Layne v. Builders Plumbing Supply Co., 569
N.E.2d 1104, 1111 (Ill. App. CL 1991)).
374. See Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Wfllborn, Employer (Ir)Rationalityand the
Demise of Employment References, 138 AM. Bus. LJ. 123, 123-24 (1992).
375. See id. at 123.
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select employees for the job in question outweigh the costs of using
that device.376
A. Determining the Benefits
The benefit side calculation for this comparison should encompass a three-step process. The first step requires an analysis of the
functions performed in the job in question. This step recognizes the
fact that the benefits of pre-employment screening may vary significantly because of the different functions performed in different
jobs.377 Unless these functions are first identified, a meaningful
cost/benefit analysis is not possible. Fortunately, this process is not
onerous and already is undertaken by many employers to enhance
compliance with the ADA.37 8
As a second step, employers should examine the identified job
functions and determine whether screening for the presence or
absence of certain identifiable skills or traits could have a significant impact on successful job performance.379 On a certain level, of
course, pre-employment screening has some potential benefit for
the performance of every job.38 0 Employers will benefit from hiring
intelligent, healthy and drug-free employees in virtually all
instances. 8 ' The importance of this step, however, is to determine
more specifically if the job functions identified in the first step indicate a particularly strong need to engage in screening activities. 3s
This need could be ascertained with reference to either the
screen-in or the screen-out function of the applicant screening pro376. See eg., Jeffrey J. Olsen, A Comprehensive Review of Private Sector Drug Testing
Law, 8 HoFsriA LAB. L.J. 223, 268 (1991).
377. See generally JOSEPH ZEMNER & CECiL D. JoHNsoN, Trm ECONOMIC BENEFIrs OF

PRIcrMNo JOB PERFORMANCE, VOL I: SELEC17ON UTnry 13 (1991).
378. The ADA provides that a "'qualified individual with a disability"' is one "who, with
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of [the job]." 42
U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). While the ADA does not require employers to develop or maintain
job descriptions, "[w]ritten job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing
applicants" are among the factors which may be relevant in determining whether a particular
function is essential. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1996). Thus, employers have a significant
incentive to analyze job functions and to prepare written job descriptions in order to
minimize potential liability under the ADA.
379. See Olsen, supra note 376, at 239, 250.
380. See generally, eg., id. at 251.
381. See generally, e.g., Jonathan V. Holtzman, Applicant Testingfor Drug Use; A Policy
and Legal Inquiry, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 47, 90 (1991).
382. See generally, eg., Olsen, supra note 376, at 269.
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cess.3s3 That is, an employer could identify significant benefits to be
gained by screening in applicants qualified for a job demanding
great skill and responsibility.384 Alternatively, an employer could
identify significant benefits to be gained by screening out applicants
who may pose too great a risk for negligent hiring exposure if
placed in a particularly sensitive position.385
In the third and final step, employers should select those screening devices that are capable of detecting the skills or traits identified in the preceding step. 386 Some devices, of course, are more
capable predictors than others in certain contexts. 3 7 The amount of
benefit that an employer gains by the use of a particular screening
technique is a direct function of the extent to which that technique
serves as a valid predictor of successful job performance.388
B. Determining the Costs
The costs or burdens of a pre-employment screening program
emanate primarily from three sources.389 One very basic consideration is the financial cost of screening. 390 Employers bear a monetary
burden with any screening program, but some devices entail a
greater financial cost than others.391
Potential legal barriers represent another "cost.''392 If the use of a
screening device is clearly unlawful in a particular context, then the
383. These functions are discussed supra at notes 10-23 and accompanying text.
384. See David L. Gregory, Reducing the Risk of Negligent Hiring,14 EML. REL. L.J 31,
39.40 (1988).
385. See id.at 33-34 (citing operators of public carriers, police officers, firefighters and
school employees as examples of such sensitive positions).
386. See id.at 36-38.
387. See id.
388. See id.at 39-40.
389. The three primary sources of these costs include the financial cost of screening, legal
barriers, and effects on applicant pool morale. See, eg., MARK CooK, PERSONNEL SELrncroN
& PRODuCmIvITy 234-35 (2d ed. 1993) (pointing out the high cost to employers of complying
with legal validation requirements for certain kinds of testing); Ann Marie Ryan & Maria
Lasek, Negligent Hiring and Defamation Areas of Liability Related to Pre-Employment
Inquiries, 44 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 293 (1991) (discussing generally the potential liability

costs related to defamation associated with pre-employment screening); Sarah Rynes, Who's
Selecting Whom? Effects of Selection Practices on Applicant Attitudes and Behavior, in
PERSONNEL SEaEcrioN n' ORGANIZATONS 240-74 (Neal Schmitt et al. eds., 1993) (discussing

generally the effects on morale of subjecting applicants to certain types of tests).
390. See e.g., Holtzman, supra note 381, at 90.
391. See generally CooK, supra note 389.
392. See Gregory, supra note 384, at 39.
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legal cost is prohibitive and automatically determines the cost/benefit comparison. 393 In other circumstances, the employer or her
attorney must gauge the potential impact of a legal challenge and
factor that into the decision-making process.
Finally, employers should consider a less measurable, yet no less
real, cost in terms of applicant-pool morale.3 94 Some screening techniques, even though arguably lawful, nonetheless may be perceived
as so intrusive or unreliable as to dissuade otherwise interested
applicants. 395 Polls indicate, for example, that the vast majority of
American adults disapprove of genetic testing as a prerequisite of
employment.396 An employer considering the adoption of such a
screening device should take this attitude into account in making its
cost/benefit comparison.
C. A Hypothetical Application
Having assessed benefits and costs, an employer may then turn to
making a relative comparison. In general, an employer's use of a
particular screening device makes sense only if the benefits exceed
the costs with respect to the job to be filled.
The following hypothetical illustrates the application of this cost/
benefit approach. Assume that an employer is in the process of hiring home care service employees. The employer has decided to
interview and check references for all finalists, but seeks legal counsel's input concerning the advisability of three other screening
devices: a criminal records check, HIV testing and integrity testing.
The first step in the cost/benefit assessment process is to identify
the functions of the home care worker position. Let's assume that
home care workers are responsible for assisting the daily living
activities of an elderly clientele. The worker visits clients in their
private homes on a daily basis and provides basic care services on
an "as needed" basis, including the following: bathing; changing bed
linens; checking basic health signs, such as body temperatures and
393. See id. at 32, 39. The use of "polygraph, blood or urine tests to ascertain veracity,
determine the presence of the AIDS virus or reveal drug or alcohol use may be prohibited."
Id at 32. "Generally, employer inquiry into arrest records is unlawful." Id. at 39.
394. See Donald H.L Hermann III, Privacy, the ProspectiveEmployee and Employment
Testing, 47 WASH. L. REv. 73, 97-102 (1971).
395. See iL at 153-54.
396. See Rorie Sherman, Employer Use of Genetic Tests to be Restricted, NAT'L W., Nov.
25, 1991, at 15,18 (reporting a poll showing that less than 10 percent of the American public
believes that employers or insurers should have the right to require genetic testing).
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making sure that medications are being taken and adequate food is
available. The position does not entail the actual delivery of direct
medical care.
The second step in this process is to ascertain whether certain
skills or traits strongly correlate with the successful performance of
these job functions. Looking first at reasons to "screen in" applicants, we see that the job functions of this position are essentially
unskilled in nature. Some basic attributes such as diligence and
friendliness are desirable, but they do not indicate a particularly
strong need to engage in pre-employment screening.
The "screen-out" function, on the other hand, is much more significant. Because these workers have access to vulnerable individuals in the privacy of their own homes, they have the capacity to
cause harm in a number of ways, including assault, theft or the
transmission of diseases such as AIDS. Since liability may arise for
any of these events under a negligent hiring theory, the employer
has a significant incentive to screen out applicants who may
increase the risk of their occurrence.
That brings us to a consideration of the individual screening
devices. The purpose of a criminal records background check is to
identify applicants who have in the past committed assaults or
engaged in theft. Assuming that past behavior is a valid predictor of
future behavior,397 the employer gains a significant benefit by
checking such records as a means of reducing negligent hiring liability exposure. This benefit is likely to outweigh the accompanying
costs. Criminal background checks are not overly expensive in most
states and, because of the obvious relevance to the position in question, are not likely to be either unlawful or unexpected.
HIV testing is likely to tilt the scales in the opposite direction.
The purpose of using such a test is to identify individuals who carry
the AIDS virus and who pose a risk of transmitting it to others.
While HIV testing is highly accurate, the risk of transmission in a
position such as this, which does not involve invasive procedures, is
extremely low.398 Moreover, the legal "cost" of such testing is quite
high, since it is likely that the disqualification of an applicant based
upon a positive test result would violate the ADA.39 9
397. See Mary F. Cook et al., Selection, in Tm AMA HANDBOOK FOR EMPLOYEE
RECRUmENT AND RETE-ON 104, 105 (Mary F. Cook ed., 1992).
398. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 183-96 and accompanying text.
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The advisability of integrity testing is more difficult to predict.
While honesty certainly is a desirable trait for this position, the scientific validity of integrity testing is questionable. 400 The potential
benefit to the employer, accordingly, is not high. But neither are the
costs. Pen-and-paper integrity tests are inexpensive and pose few, if
any, legal risks.40 1 The decision to use this device may come down
to whether the employer believes it is more important to send
future employees a message that honesty is expected or, conversely,
not to lose qualified applicants who may be offended by a test perceived as unreliable. In any event, the important point is not the
actual decision itself, but the fact that the decision is made in recognition of the actual benefits and costs at stake.
This hypothetical, then, illustrates how employers can successfully navigate the pre-employment screening pathway through the
use of a cost/benefit comparison. It illustrates something else, as
well. A pre-employment screening program that focuses narrowly
on those skills and traits necessary for successful job performance
are likely to be both lawful and advisable. A screening program that
is not so narrowly focused is more likely to be neither.
V.

SUGGESTIONS FOR LAW REFORM

As this article demonstrates, the "law" of pre-employment
screening comes from a myriad of sources-state and federal, statutory and judicial. The result is an overly complicated and sometimes
inconsistent web of regulation. This section suggests four ways in
which the legal framework can be improved.
A. Harmonize the PermissibleScope of Pre-employment
Inquiries Under FederalAnti-DiscriminationLaws
Title VII and the ADA take dissimilar approaches to preemployment inquiries made in applications and interviews. Title
VII does not restrict the pre-offer acquisition of information relating to protected class status, but does ban discriminatory employment decisions made on the basis of such information. 402 The ADA,
in contrast, substantially bars both the inquiry and the use of infor400. See supra notes 309-28 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 313-16 and accompanying text.
402. See EEOC Guide to Pre-EmploymentInquiries,8A Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA)
443:65-66 (1992).
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mation relating to physical or mental impairments. 40 3 This disparate
regulatory approach adds needless confusion to the application and
interview process.
The preferable approach is that taken by the ADA. As the
EEOC's Technical Assistance Manual for the ADA explains, the
ADA prohibits inquiries about disability status because such information is "frequently... used to exclude people with disabilities
from jobs they are able to perform." 4" Put another way, even without any intentional ill will, employers who have knowledge concerning the protected class status of applicants may make
stereotypical assumptions about their capabilities or work habits.
An employer who inquires into an applicant's child care plans or
pattern of religious observances may have difficulty ignoring that
information in making hiring decisions. The ADA takes an "out of
sight, out of mind" approach to pre-offer inquiries to focus the hiring decision on ability rather than status. Title VII should be
amended to do the same.
B. Permit Pre-employment Medical Examinations Only for
Job-Related Capabilitiesor Conditions
The ADA's treatment of medical examinations raises a somewhat similar concern. The ADA permits pre-employment medical
examinations only after an employer has extended a conditional
offer of employment and then only if required of all new hires
within the same job category.405 The ADA, however, does not place
any limitation on the permissible scope of these post-offer medical
examinations. Thus, an employer may require an offeree to
undergo a comprehensive medical examination even in the absence
of any correlation between the examination components and the
planned job duties. The only substantive limitation is that an
employer may not withdraw the offer for any medical reason other
than an inability to perform the essential functions of the job.40 6
This approach to medical examinations is inconsistent with the
"out of sight, out of mind" notion that the ADA adopts with
respect to pre-offer inquiries. It permits an employer to obtain pre403.
404.
405.
406.

See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)-(3) (1994).
See TECHaNCAL Asswsm.rcE MANUAL FOR THE ADA § 6.3 (1992).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(A).
See id. §§ 12112(d)(2) (B), 12112(d)(3)(C); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3) (1996).
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hire access to medical information that has no relationship to the
performance of job duties. Although the employer is not supposed
to act on medical results that are not job-related, the ADA imposes
no duty on the employer to inform the offeree about either what is
being tested or the subsequent reason(s) for withdrawing an offer.
At worst, this approach enables clandestine discrimination. Less
egregiously, it taints the hiring process with unnecessary medical
information.
The ADA should be amended along the lines of the Minnesota
Human Rights Act. The Minnesota statute provides that a conditional, post-offer medical examination may test only for essential,
job-related capabilities. 7 This strikes the appropriate balance by
permitting an employer to obtain medical information relevant to
job performance, but without exposing the hiring decision to irrelevant information concerning medical status.
C. Pre-employment Drug Testing Warrants a FederalStatute
As noted above, a growing number of state and local governments have adopted state drug testing statutes.408 These statutes
vary widely in both substantive and procedural effect. When coupled with common law litigation in states without drug testing laws,
multi-state employers face a complex and inconsistent web of
regulation.
A federal statute would bring needed uniformity to this area of
the law. Statutes in states such as Vermont provide a suitable
model. These statutes recognize that an employer should have the
right to disqualify finalists who use illegal drugs. Accordingly, the
Vermont statute authorizes employers to test applicants for illegal
drug use after making a conditional job offer.40 9 On the other hand,
these statutes also recognize that applicants deserve a drug testing
process that is fair and reliable. Accordingly, the Vermont statute
provides for such procedural safeguards as advance notice of testing, chain of custody requirements, designated laboratories and
confirmatory retests of positive results.41 0 A federal statute that
407. See MwN. STAT. ANN.§ 363.02, subd. 1(8)(i)(a)-(b) (West 1995).
408. See discussion supra notes 251-71 and accompanying text.
409. See Vr. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 512(b)(1) (1987).

410. See 1d. § 514-15.
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incorporates these provisions would represent a significant step
forward.
D. Reduce the Threat of Defamation Liability for Employers
in Providing Reference Information
Many employers do not provide any meaningful response to reference requests because of a fear of defamation liability.4 1 Defamation law should be adjusted to reduce the current reluctance of
employers to share this socially useful information.
The prevailing practice of withholding reference information is
harmful in a number of ways. First, it deprives prospective employers of information that might screen out applicants who are illsuited or potentially dangerous with respect to the position to be
filled. On the flip side, both prospective employers and "good"
employees are harmed by the withholding of information that
would assist in identifying those applicants who are best-suited for
the job. The present disincentive to information exchange is also
harmful on a societal level because it inhibits the efficient matching
of employees and jobs in the national economy. In another vein, it
has been suggested that the absence of references may harm the
productivity of current employees who otherwise would be motivated by the prospect of a good reference.412 Finally, fear of liability, particularly with respect to self-publication defamation, may
lead employers to withhold performance evaluations and explanations of the reasons for a discharge decision, 413 a trend certainly not
conducive to either fairness or future productivity.
The legal system, apparently recognizing the utility of employment references, recently has responded in two ways to encourage
their use. One of these responses uses a "stick" as an incentive, the
other a "carrot."
The "stick" method encourages employers to provide references
as an alternative to facing possible liability for negligent referral.
The negligent referral cause of action, first proposed in a 1991 law
411. See discussion supra notes 344-75 and accompanying text.
412. See Charles D. iefer, Comment, Qualified Privilege to Defame Employees and
CreditApplicants, 12 HAxv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 143, 171 n.169 (1977).
413. See Deborah Daniloff, Note, Employer Defamation: Reasons and Remedies for
Declining References and Chilled Communications in the Workplace, 40 HASTmIs LJ. 687,
689 (1989).
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review note,414 was recognized in a recent California decision,
Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District.415 In that case, a
student was allegedly molested by a principal who had been hired
by the school district after receiving a positive recommendation
from a previous school district employer.416 The recommendation
failed to disclose that the principal had resigned from his former
position under pressure because of various sexual misconduct
charges. 417 The student's personal injury suit included several
claims against the former school district that were dismissed at the
trial court level.41 8 The Supreme Court of California, affirming the
Court of Appeal decision reversing the trial court, held:
[T]he writer of a letter of recommendation owes to prospective
employers and third persons a duty not to misrepresent the facts
in describing the qualifications and character of a former
employee, if making these misrepresentations would present a
substantial, foreseeable risk419of physical injury to the prospective
employer or third persons.
Other courts have not been receptive to the negligent referral
cause of action. A New York court, for example, declined to recognize the negligent referral tort in a factual setting very similar to
that of Randi W.420 The court explained that "[t]he mere recommendation of a person for potential employment is not a proper
basis for asserting a claim of negligence where another party is
responsible for the actual hiring."4 2
Whether or not the notion of negligent referral liability makes
sense in the narrow fact setting of Randi W., the recognition of this
claim will do little to encourage references in most settings. Indeed,
it may do the opposite, since the majority opinion in Randi W. suggests that liability for negligent referral arises only where the for414. See Janet Swerdlow, Note, Negligent Referral: A Potential Theory for Employer
Liability, 64 S.CAL. L. REv. 1645, 1647 (1991).
415. 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).
416. See id. at 582.
417. See id. at 585.
418. See id. at 586.
419. Id. at 591.
420. See Cohen v. Wales, 133 A.D.2d 94, 95 (1987). In Cohen, the plaintiff's claim of
negligence against the defendant was based on its recommendation of a former employee for
a grammar school teacher's position without disclosing past charges of sexual misconduct
against the employee. See id.
421. Id.
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mer employer actually provides a reference, but fails to include
422
information concerning the applicant's dangerous propensities.
The "carrot" alternative appears to be more promising. Over the
past few years, several states have enacted statutes that legislatively
immunize employers from defamation liability in most instances
when providing accurate reference information.4'
Some of these statutes appear to do little more than codify the
existing common law of defamation. An Illinois statute adopted in
1996, for example, states that an employer who provides reference
"information that it believes in good faith is truthful... is presumed
to be acting in good faith and is immune from civil liability."4 4 This
presumption, however, may be rebutted by a preponderance of evidence showing that the information was "knowingly false." 4' This
language essentially summarizes already recognized principles of
qualified privilege and malice.426 One commentator has suggested
that the apparent purpose of this statute was not so much to change
the law, but to send a message to the courts to strike the balance
slightly more in favor of free communication of references and
against defamation.4 27
Wisconsin's statute, also enacted in 1996, is similar, but with one
significant distinction. Under the Wisconsin law, the presumption of
good faith that results in immunity may be overcome only if a plaintiff can establish by "clear and convincing evidence" that an
employer knowingly provided false reference information. 428 This
language changes existing law by raising the quantum of proof that
a former employee must produce in order to dispel the privilege or
immunity that attaches to the employer's conduct in communicating
an employment reference.
422. See generally Randi W., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473, 478-79.
423. See Concerns Linger About Job Reference Immunity Statutes, 11 Individual EmpI.
Rep. (BNA) No. 15 at 3 (June 4, 1996) (listing fourteen states-Alaska, Arizona, California,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Tennessee and Wisconsin-that have enacted job reference immunity laws).
424. See 1996 M1.Laws, Public Act 89-470, § 10 (to be codified at ILu. ANN. STAT. ch. 745,
46110).
425. See id.
426. The principles of qualified privilege and malice are discussed supra at notes 349-56
and accompanying text.
427. See Concerns Linger About Job Reference Immunity Statutes, supra note 423, at 3
(reporting comments made by Matthew Finkin, Professor of Law at the University of
Illinois).
428. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.487 (West 1996).
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The Wisconsin statute represents an appropriate adjustment in
reference defamation law. It expands the safe harbor available to
an employer in providing reference information, yet continues to
protect employees who clearly are defamed by statements made
with knowing falsity. Whether the Wisconsin law or any of the other
statutes will have the desired effect of encouraging employment references, of course, remains a matter of conjecture.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The law of pre-employment screening has grown into a tangled
web of regulation that is difficult for both employers and employees
to negotiate. Employers, in particular, perceive themselves as
caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place in deciding
whether to engage in pre-employment screening activities. This perception results from the fact that employers sometimes are liable
when they engage in pre-employment screening and sometimes are
liable when they do not.
This article has attempted to reduce the complexity of preemployment screening on three levels. First, the article provides a
comprehensive road map to the legal landscape of pre-employment
screening. Second, the article suggests a cost/benefit method of
analysis to assist employers in determining when and how to engage
in pre-employment screening activities in light of the current legal
framework. Finally, the article proposes some basic legal reforms
that would enhance both fairness and consistency in the law of preemployment screening. Hopefully, this article will be of assistance
to both employers and employees in successfully navigating the preemployment screening process.
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